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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN CAPITAL MOBILITY, GROWTH, AND, 
MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY 
by 
Ping-Hang Fan 
 
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Hamid Mohtadi 
 
This dissertation comprises three chapters in international macroeconomics. Specifically, 
we focus on international financial integration and its linkage to economic growth and 
volatility. In Chapter 1, we revisit the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle that saving-
investment correlation exhibits a pattern contrary to expectation, being higher among the 
OECD countries that are more financially integrated and lower among emerging markets 
economies with less financial integration and greater capital controls. We find that the 
evolution of FH coefficient is highly consistent with increased financial integration over 
time, thus resolving the puzzle dynamically. We also explain the cross-country 
component of the puzzle by showing that financial market imperfections influence how 
well FH coefficient measures capital mobility. 
In chapter 2, we study the linkage between financial integration and economic growth. 
We develop a dynamic stochastic model that generalizes Obstfeld’s (1994) model by 
incorporating the costs from systemic risk besides the well-known benefit from risk-
  
iii 
 
sharing by Obstfeld (1994). We show that potential cost from the systemic risk could 
lower the benefit from risk diversification in an integrated financial market. By using the 
stock market data from Taiwan and US to calibrate the model, we find that the 
predictions of the model are consistent with actual data on growth. 
In chapter 3, we study the relationship between financial integration and economic 
volatility. Prior research that has studied this relationship has not explored the potentially 
distinct effects of capital inflows and capital out flows on volatility. Our contribution is to 
make this crucial distinction conducting our analysis. We find that non-OECD countries 
with higher levels of external debt assets are associated with lower consumption volatility, 
and external debt liabilities are associated with higher consumption volatility. This 
finding is insignificant for OECD countries. 
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Chapter 1 
International Capital Mobility Revisited: 
A Dynamic View of Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Understanding global financial integration is the key to understand the functioning of 
the global economy. Yet, the most basic ingredient for this understanding, i.e., how to 
measure financial integration has eluded economists. In their seminal paper, Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980) focused on the correlation between savings and investments (the so 
called FH coefficient), based on the idea that such a correlation is inversely related to 
international capital mobility: a high correlation should imply a lower capital mobility as 
savings must equal investments in autarky, while a low correlation should imply a higher 
international capital mobility as capital inflows and outflows fill any gaps. Yet from its 
early days the Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis faced the puzzling observation that saving-
investment correlation exhibited a reverse pattern: It was higher among the OECD 
countries that were more financially integrated and lower among emerging markets 
economies which experienced less financial integration and greater capital controls (e.g., 
Frankel, 1992). This observation paved the way for what came to be the "Feldstein-
Horioka (FH) puzzle". 
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There have been numerous attempts to address or explain the FH puzzle over the past 
three decades
1
. Of these early contributions, a statement by Frankel (1992) stands out. 
Frankel observed that, “if the saving-investment regressions were a good test for barriers 
to financial-market integration, one would expect to see the coefficient falling over time. 
Until recently, this prediction has not been supported by the evidence…” (Frankel, 1992, 
pp. 198). It is this observation that this paper tries to address among its several other 
contributions. 
Specifically, we show that this dynamic trend in falling FH coefficient (a) does in fact 
exist and (b) is related to measures of international capital mobility over time. This paper 
is thus a fresh new attempt at addressing this old puzzle. It finds that in its dynamic form, 
the original Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis may be in fact vindicated. Further, the paper 
explains part of the reason for the persistence of the puzzle across countries and provides 
evidence of this explanation. It is remarkable that despite the existence of many factors 
militating against the validity of the FH coefficient as a measure of capital mobility, we 
do in fact find strong evidence in its favor in a dynamic sense. Our findings point to the 
robustness and longevity of the original hypothesis at least dynamically. 
                                                          
1
 For example, Sinn (1992) suggested the possibility of an upward bias in the FH coefficient, due to the 
averaging of values over time in FH’s original paper; Frankel (1992) suggested that the high value of the 
coefficient may be due to the procyclicality of savings and investments;  Feldstein (1994) and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000) attributed the high value of the coefficient to the “home bias” in investor preferences; 
Devereux (1996) argued that the high value may be due to the simultaneous effect from the taxation 
policies; Chu (2012) suggested the possibility of an upward bias due to the use of a common price deflator. 
Frankel (1992) has observed that currency and interest rate differentials and a lack of substitutability 
between different kinds of capital all make the FH coefficient an unreliable measure of capital mobility. For 
a detailed survey up to 2008, see Apergis and Tsoumas (2009). 
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The paper makes three distinct contributions to this literature: First, we address the FH 
puzzle by departing from both the customary cross country averaging or single-parameter 
time series estimation and introduce a time-varying-parameter (TVP) model in order to 
uncover the potential dynamic evolution of the FH coefficient.
2
 Utilizing data for 67 
countries from 1970 to 2009, and applying the TVP model to each one, we find that the 
FH coefficients has in fact fallen over time in most economies of the sample, whether 
developing or developed. 
Our second contribution is to re-examine the age old question of whether the FH 
coefficient is an appropriate measure of international capital mobility. To do this, we 
need a measure of international capital mobility that is unrelated to, and is thus 
independent of, the FH coefficient itself. For this purpose, we utilize two indices of 
international mobility constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). These indices have 
been widely applied as measures of international financial integration, yet surprisingly 
not in the context of examining the FH hypothesis
3
. We then show that in this dynamic 
view, both the FH coefficient and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices are in fact 
consistent: The decline in the FH correlation over time is associated with rise in the Lane-
Milesi-Ferretti measures of international financial or international equity integration over 
time. These results tend to vindicate the classic role of the FH coefficient and move away 
from the FH puzzle. They suggest that dynamically, the correlation between saving and 
                                                          
2
 Other recent efforts at dynamically estimating the FH coefficients do exist, yet they are either sporadic--
for example, carried out for only one or a few countries--or employ methods that suffer from various 
shortcomings. This literature is discussed extensively in a later section. 
3
 See section 1.2.2 for details of these measures. 
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investment (FH coefficient) is in fact a valid measure of international capital mobility 
after all. Thus, when FH hypothesis is interpreted dynamically, our results depart from 
prevailing view. We further apply this method to check for the size effect as per Frankel 
(1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1993), which states that the FH coefficients are generally 
higher for large economies, on the presumption of greater endogeneity of the co-
movements between saving and investment for these countries. 
Our third contribution is explaining part of the cross country persistence of the puzzle. 
Verifying the cross-sectional persistence with our data we offer capital market 
imperfections as an explanation and use a unique dataset known as the KAOPEN index 
by Chinn and Ito (2008) to measure the level of capital market deregulation in relation to 
the FH hypothesis. We find that when the capital markets are highly deregulated, the 
correlation between the FH coefficient and international integration indices is “more 
negative”. Thus, the more deregulated an economy is, the more accurately the FH 
coefficient reveals the degree of its capital mobility. 
Navigating the complex web of the FH hypothesis and the FH puzzle and decoupling 
it into dynamic and cross-sectional dimensions we are thus able to address the puzzle 
dynamically and find salient explanation for its cross-county persistence. Given the 
critical importance of saving and investment to financial and goods markets and to fiscal, 
monetary and capital market policies, the significance of revisiting the original 
hypothesis--both reaffirming it dynamically, and explaining where it may not hold 
statically-- cannot be overstated. 
Section 1.2 provides the conceptual framework and a brief review of the literature on 
the puzzle and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) measures of international financial 
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integration. Section 1.3 describes the data and introduces the TVP model. Section 1.4 
shows the results of the TVP model and the relationship between the FH coefficients and 
the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti measures. Section 1.5 describes the KAOPEN index by Chinn 
and Ito (2008) and examines the hypothesis that capital market openness affects the 
validity of FH coefficients in terms of capital mobility. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2  Conceptual framework and literature review 
1.2.1  Feldstein and Horioka Puzzle 
Using a simple cross-sectional regression of investments on savings as fraction of 
GDP for 16 OECD countries for the 1960-1974, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found a 
highly significant and positive coefficient of the savings term. This finding's surprising 
implication that international capital mobility among the OECD countries was limited 
(hence the "puzzle"), received considerable attention and inspired much subsequent 
research. Some researchers re-estimated the FH coefficient using the same cross-sectional 
approach with later dates and reaffirmed the puzzle (Feldstein, 1983; Penati and Dooley, 
1984; Obstfeld, 1986; Feldstein and Bachetta, 1991); others expanded the sample, 
focusing on the FH coefficients among different types of economies. For example, 
Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987) applying the cross-sectional test to 62 countries, 
found that the least developed countries were more likely to experience smaller FH 
coefficients and high income countries were more likely to experience higher level of FH 
coefficients, thus accentuating the puzzle. Similar puzzling findings were echoed in 
Kasuga’s (2004) study of 79 developing and 23 OECD countries. 
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In this paper we ask; can introducing a time dimension help solve the puzzle? A 
number of studies have tried to estimate the FH coefficient by time-series or panel data. 
For example, using US data from 1946 to 1987, Miller (1988) found that national saving 
and domestic investment appear cointegrated prior to 1971 during the fixed exchange rate 
regime, but not so after 1971 where Bretton Woods was abandoned. Gulley (1992), 
however, showed that a cointegrated relationship between savings and investments exists 
in both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Sinha and Sinha (2004) utilized an 
error-correction (EC) model that yielded results consistent with Gulley’s (1992).4 
As for panel data approaches, Krol (1996) estimated the FH coefficient in a fixed 
effects model, finding it to be lower than in previous studies, thus leading to the claim the 
FH puzzle vanishes under his approach. However, this claim would be based on a priori 
thinking that capital mobility should be high among most countries. Yet, as we have seen, 
Sinha and Sinha’s (2004) finding of high savings-investment cointegration suggests the 
opposite. Jansen (2000) argues that Krol’s (1996) results include an outlier, i.e., 
Luxemburg, and that the FH coefficient is considerably larger if Luxemburg is dropped 
from the sample. Vamviskidis and Wacziarg (1998) apply a fixed effects panel model to 
a sample of countries from 1970 to 93, finding the FH coefficient to be 0.671 for the 
OECD countries but only 0.246 for the remaining 83 developing countries. In short, time-
series and panel data approaches seem unable to provide consistent and robust results due 
                                                          
4
 However, a complicating factor is the surprising exception in their finding that low income countries 
exhibit lower FH coefficient (indicating higher capital mobility), a finding also shared with ours (see later), 
and one that leaves the FH puzzle unresolved, at least for this group. 
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to the sensitivity from both the sample selection and model selection and therefore cannot 
either explain or resolve the FH puzzle. 
As the saga continues, several researchers have argued that the FH coefficient is not a 
proper measure of capital mobility from a theoretical point of view, arguing that saving 
and investment are highly correlated no matter what the level of capital mobility or 
financial integration is (Obstfeld, 1986; Engel and Kletzer, 1989; Finn, 1990; Cardia, 
1991; Mendoza, 1991; Tesar, 1993; Stockman and Tesar, 1995). Cardia (1992) further 
shows, based on an open-economy model, that both the failure of real interest parity and 
productivity changes are each sufficient to generate a high positive correlation between 
national saving and investment. Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) introduce the 
role of human capital. Under the assumption that perfect capital mobility leads to steady-
state convergence for per capita output, physical and human capital, they find that the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility is irrelevant in explaining the behavior of the 
steady-state variables of physical and human capital. Thus, a strong relationship between 
saving and investment is obtained, regardless of the degree of physical and human capital 
mobility. Xie (1998) provides an endogenous growth model in which the range of 
differentiated consumption goods and specialized producer durables are both 
endogenously determined, showing that this feature yields a high degree of saving-
investment correlation even when international financial markets are integrated. 
Although such theoretical attempts are important, the role of evidence remains crucial. 
Returning to empirics, a fundamental limitation in time-series or panel data estimation 
methods is that they produce a single estimator of FH coefficient, thus forgoing 
information otherwise available from the dynamic properties of capital mobility. As a 
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precursor to the key importance of dynamics in addressing the FH puzzle, for example, 
the application of a Markov-switching technique by Ho (2000) and Telatar, Telatar and 
Bolatoglu (2007), which allows the samples to be drawn from two different time regimes 
(regime-switching model), showed that the coefficient was significantly different in these 
two regimes. In the same spirit, by applying the endogenous structural break model for 
UK, Ozmen and Parmaksiz (2003) found that major policy changes in different periods 
affected the correlation between savings and investments. This sensitivity of the 
correlation to different time regimes suggests a pathway of research towards a possible 
resolution of the puzzle by focusing on dynamics.  
One essential limitation of the Markov-switching technique, however, is their 
exogenous choice of the number of time regimes, rending the method somewhat rigid. An 
alternative and more flexible approach is the time-varying-parameter (TVP) estimation 
technique which estimates the evolution of the entire pattern of the FH coefficient over 
time. However, both the TVP and the Markov Switching models have so far been applied 
to either a single country or a small set of countries.
5
 In so doing they cannot address the 
cross country variations in FH, especially those between developed and less developed 
countries, which is a central part of the FH puzzle. By applying the TVP model to a 
larger sample (including developed and developing economies), this paper is able to 
address the puzzle both dynamically and across countries. 
 
                                                          
5
 In terms of the TVP method, Hatemi-J and Hacker (2007) apply a TVP model only to Sweden and 
Ibrahim and Harun (2010) apply it only to G7. In terms of Markov Switching model, Ho (2000) studies 
Taiwan and Telatar, et.al. (2007) study several European economies.  
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1.2.2  Measurement of Capital Mobility: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti Indices 
The second objective of this paper is to examine whether or not the FH coefficient 
actually measures capital mobility. Due to the complexity of the current account structure, 
the relationship between domestic saving and investment (FH coefficient) may in turn be 
quite complex. For example, the interpretation of the FH coefficients contains not only 
the degree of capital mobility, but also implicitly the differences in policies and capital 
market regulations across countries. In fact numerous papers have questioned the 
feasibility of FH coefficient as a measure of capital mobility
6
. Here, we would like to re-
examine this question with respect to a dynamic view of the FH coefficient per country, 
thus avoiding complicating cross country variations. For this purpose, we must use a 
measure of capital mobility that is both independent of FH coefficient itself as well as 
dynamic. We introduce two indices of international financial integration, originally 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and later updated (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007), that measure countries’ stock of external assets and liabilities from the 
flow data computed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also known as 
International investment Position, IIP. The two measures are IFIGDP and GEQY; the 
first includes all five categories of the IMF’s IIP: portfolio investments, foreign direct 
investments (FDI), other investments, financial derivatives and reserve assets, all as a 
share of GDP; and the second contains only the equity components of IIP, the portfolio 
investment in equity
7
 as well as FDI. Figure 1.1 shows the pattern of IFIGDP and GEQY 
                                                          
6
 For a detailed survey, see Apergis and Tsoumas (2009). 
7
 The methodology is described in the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition, 1993 (BPM5). The 
portfolio investment category includes both a debt and an equity component. Only the latter is used for 
constructing GEQY while both are used for constructing IFIGDP. 
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for four income groups (taking the group median). As can be seen, with one exception
8
, 
both the IFIGDP and GEQY show a secular upward trend over the last four decades. This 
is consistent with the common expectation of an overall increase in international financial 
integration over this period. In what follows we will examine this question rigorously.  
[Insert Figure 1.1 here] 
1.3  Data and TVP model 
1.3.1  Data 
To estimate the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient, we collect the annual saving and 
investment data (relative to GDP) from 1970 to 2009 for 67 countries, classified as: (1) 
high-income OECD; (2) upper-middle income; (3) lower-middle income; (4) low 
income
9
. Table 1.1 shows an average investment rate of about 22% for the whole sample, 
15% for low-income countries, and 24-25% for OECD and high-middle income countries, 
i.e. more than 10 percentage points higher than for lower-middle and low income group. 
Saving rates on the other hand indicate greater volatility, especially among middle 
income countries, as can be seen from figure 1.2. Table 1.2 shows the correlation of 
savings and investments for each country in the sample, reaffirming the Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) puzzle when viewed across country groups: While for most countries the 
correlation is positive, it is higher on average for the OECD group than for upper-middle 
group, whose average coefficient is in turn higher than that for the lower-middle income 
group. This is the opposite of what one would expect from the relative mobility of capital 
                                                          
8
 The IFIGDP measure for the low income countries shows a decline since mid 1990. 
9
 Data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI).  The 67 countries include Saudi Arabia (SAU), 
the only high-income non-OECD country in the sample. But due to data limitations, we cannot include 
other high-income non-OECDs. 
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among the three country groups, hence reaffirming the puzzle cross-sectionally. The one 
exception to the puzzle is the low income group which exhibits the highest correlation 
and for which we would expect lowest capital mobility. But aside from the fact that there 
are only 6 countries in this group and thus a generalization is questionable, later we will 
learn that this group does in fact exhibit surprisingly high capital mobility and thus, in 
this sense, it does also contribute to the reaffirmation of the puzzle. We now turn to our 
dynamic analysis. 
[Insert Table 1.1 here] 
[Insert Figure 1.2 here] 
[Insert Table 1.2 here] 
1.3.2  Dynamic Estimation of FH: A Preliminary Test    
As was discussed in section 1.2, the most common methods in previous research have 
been cross-sectional, time-series or panel. These methods all produce a single estimator 
of FH coefficient which may be too restrictive. For example, in the previous section, we 
observed the fluctuation of the saving and investment rates in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 
and saw that they move together in some periods, but deviate in others. To examine 
whether or not the relationship between savings and investments is constant, we construct, 
as a precursor to our fully dynamic estimation (see Section 1.4), a panel regression fixed 
effects model, which can potentially detect some preliminary dynamics of the savings-
investments correlations. To do this we introduce some simple decade-dummies as 
follows:  
(
 
 
)
  
      (
 
 
)
  
 ∑   [   (
 
 
)
  
]                                       (1-1) 
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where    ⁄     is the investment rate;    ⁄     is the saving rate;    (k=1…4) is a dummy 
variable equaling 1 in the sample period k and zero otherwise. The four periods are, (1) 
1970-1979 (base period); (2) 1980-1989; (3) 1990-1999; (4) 2000-2009. Finally,     
denotes the set of controls, including natural log of GDP per capita, and population to 
control for country size effect (see Section 1.4.2). Results are reported in Table 1.3, for 
the full sample as well as 4 subsamples (OECD, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low 
income countries). Having tested for panel unit-roots and ruled out the possibility of a 
spurious regression,
10
 the coefficient of the saving rate for the base period 1970-79 
(       , the FH coefficient) is positive and significant across all groups, echoing the 
previous findings of a positive correlation between saving and investment. But the key 
variables are the interaction terms (          ). The coefficients show two features (a) 
they are all negative and significant and (b) for each decade they are progressively more 
negative and significantly different from the previous decade. All this is consistent with 
the idea the coefficient declines over time among all different groups and is thus 
potentially consistent with the idea of increasing international capital mobility.
11
 In sum, 
even at a basic level of gross partitioning of time into 10-year periods we find that the 
                                                          
10
 Of the several available panel unit-root tests, the two most prominent ones are the IPS (Im, Pesaran and 
Shin, 2003), and the LLC (Levin-Lin-Chu, 2002) tests. The IPS test is more appropriate in our case since it 
is more general and can apply to unbalanced panels and missing observations. Using this test, the 
investment rate and saving rate on full sample and each sub-sample are stationary, and thus there is no 
spurious regression in the estimation in Table 1.3. The IPS panel unit-root test results are shown in 
Appendix B. 
11
 Across groups, the higher base-decade coefficient for OECD (0.332) compared to same coefficient for 
upper middle income and lower middle income groups (0.273 and 0.096) hints at the persistence of the 
cross-sectional form of the FH puzzle. But the much higher coefficient for low income group (0.62) is 
unusual. The small number of countries in this subsample might be one explanation. We shall return to the 
cross-sectional evidence in Section 1.5. 
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correlation between saving and investment may well not be constant, but rather, time 
variant. These results are suggestive of deeper underlying dynamics of the FH 
coefficients and call for a more rigorous investigation. To do this, we will now apply the 
time-varying-parameter method, estimating the FH coefficient in each country over time.  
[Insert Table 1.3 here] 
1.3.3  Time-varying-parameter (TVP) Method  
Following Harvey (1987) and Kim and Nelson (1999), the regression that form the 
basis of the TVP model can be written as state-space form whose coefficients vary in 
time and possess certain specific dynamic properties. We estimate FH coefficient ( ) for 
each country i in the following so called measurement equation:
12
 
(
 
 
)
 
      (
 
 
)
 
                                                         (1-2) 
The corresponding transition equation is: 
                                                                        (1-3) 
                 
                 
With the recursive procedure of Kalman filter, we compute the optimal estimate of 
unobserved-state vector    (the FH coefficient) in a dynamic domain and estimate the 
parameters in Kalman filter using MLE. 
  
                                                          
12
 The TVP model applied in our paper is a standard approach, which presumes the FH coefficient follows 
the Markov process with AR(1) setting. Other TVP approaches, such as TVP in GARCH, are not 
appropriate for the present purpose due to the nature of the data. In this case, for example, TVP in GARCH 
is suitable for high frequency data while our data is of course annual. 
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1.4  TVP Estimation Results and the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti indices 
1.4.1  TVP Estimation Results  
Results, presented in Appendix A (Figures A-1 to A-4), show that for most countries 
the FH coefficients exhibits a noticeable decline over time. Few noteworthy observations 
are as follows: In US, the coefficient drops from 0.97 in 1973 to 0.66 in 2009; in UK it 
drops from 0.91 to 0.65; in China it drops from 0.83 to 0.59; while in India it drops from 
0.87 to 0.38. One interesting case is Luxemburg for which the coefficient is at 0.41 in 
1973. This is much lower than other countries in the OECD group, and it drops even 
further to a low value of 0.16 in 2009. To show the general pattern of the estimated 
results, the mean value of the time varying FH coefficient for the full sample and each 
subsample are plotted against time (Figure 1.3)
13
. It is clearly evident that the FH 
coefficients exhibit a declining trend. From 1973 to 2009, the average value of the 
coefficient drops from 0.88 to 0.33 across all countries, from 0.94 to 0.51 for OECD 
countries, from 0.93 to 0.25 for the upper-middle income group, from 0.88 to 0.21 for 
lower-middle income group, and from 0.69 to 0.39 for the low income countries. This is a 
strong confirmation of the finding of the previous section in which the coefficient 
declined from decade to decade (Table 1.3).  Further, note that the coefficient is higher 
among the OECD than other groups, a finding that is consistent with the findings by 
Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987), Vamviskidis and Wacziarg (1998) and Kasuga 
(2004). 
[Insert Figure 1.3 here] 
                                                          
13
 While the time period is 1973-2009, the first 3 years are dropped due to the estimation of TVP model. 
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1.4.2. Relation to International Capital Mobility over Time  
Using the estimated FH coefficients, we now come to the second main contribution of 
this paper: to examine the relationship of the FH coefficient to the actual and 
independently measured index of international capital mobility, as developed by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti presented earlier. The original proposition, put forth by Feldstein and 
Horioka, is that higher (lower) levels of capital mobility imply lower (higher) FH 
coefficient.  
For each country, we apply Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach 
(Pesaran et. al., 2001) to find the long-run relationship between FH coefficient and the 
financial integration indices by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The models are specified 
as follow, 
          ∑   
  
            ∑   
  
                        
                                                                                                  (1-4) 
          ∑   
  
            ∑   
  
                      
                                                                                                  (1-5) 
In Equations (1-4) and (1-5) we can obtain short-run and long-run estimates in a 
single step. By Pesaran et. al. (2001), the advantage of applying the ARDL model is that 
the variables could be I(1) or I(0) or a combination of the two. Cointegration can be 
tested by joint significance of    and    in equation (1-4) and    and    in equation (1-5) 
(F test). Alternatively, we could also re-estimate the model with lagged error-correction 
term (     ) based on the fitted values (  ,  ,    and   ) in equations (1-4) and (1-5). 
The fitted values are determined by Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) used to select 
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the optimum lags (Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan, 2006). The variables are cointegrated if 
the coefficient of        is significantly negative. 
The long-run effect can be estimated by normalizing the lagged-linear combination in 
equations (1-4) and (1-5). In other words, the long-run coefficients are   ̂   ̂  in 
equation (1-4) and   ̂   ̂  in equation (1-5). Results, reported in Table 1.4, show that, in 
general, the FH coefficients and IFIGDP have negative long-run relationship for most of 
the countries. The long-run coefficients between the FH coefficients and GEQY are 
somewhat similar. Some of the long-run coefficients are insignificantly negative, but we 
find the FH coefficients and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices are still significantly 
cointegrated. This is one of our key findings: Greater capital mobility over time is now 
associated with a reduction in the correlation between saving and investment. This is 
precisely in accordance with Feldstein and Horioka’s original intuition. 
[Insert Table 1.4 here] 
To examine the significance of the relationship between FH coefficients and the Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti indices, not only over time, but also across countries, we estimate a 
panel regression with fixed effects for each country group. 
   
                                                                        (1-6) 
   
     
    
          
                                                     (1-7) 
where, for country i at time t,     
   is the FH coefficient,          and        are the 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices, and           is the natural log of GDP per capita. 
17 
 
 
 
Results are reported in Table 1.5
14
. The point of this investigation is of course the 
same as in the time series approach of Table 1.4, but in a panel regression framework. If 
the FH coefficients are to be an inverse measure of international capital mobility, then    
and   
 
 are expected to be negative. From Table 1.5, in the “All Countries” sample, the 
estimated coefficients of IFIGDP and GEQY are negative and significant even with the 
control of GDP per capita. This is consistent with findings from the correlation 
coefficients in Table 1.4. In the four subsamples, we still find strong evidence that the FH 
coefficient is inversely related to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices but the results are 
more robust for the upper-middle and the lower-middle income groups than for the other 
two groups
 15,16
, and interestingly, much larger (in absolute value) for the scale of the 
coefficients of the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti indices for upper-middle income countries than 
                                                          
14
 By using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) panel unit-root test (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003), we examine 
the stationarity of the FH coefficients, IFIGDP and GEQY on whole sample and each sub-sample group 
(refer to Appendix B). The result shows that the dependent variable (FH coefficient) and independent 
variables (IFIGDP and GEQY) do not have the same degree of integration. Therefore, there is no spurious 
regression issue in the estimations of Table 1.5. 
15
 For example, the OECD countries exhibit the same pattern (of the negative relationship) but only when 
the control variable is not included. When the control variable is added, the estimators for OECD become 
insignificant. In the low income group, the effectiveness of FH coefficient is supported by the negative and 
significant estimators on IFIGDP, but not for the GEQY. One reason for the latter may be the limited 
sample size (only six countries) and the greater heterogeneity among the low income countries (For 
example this group exhibit exceptionally high variance in its current accounts across the group members). 
16
 An alternative measure, developed by Chinn and Ito, known as the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 
2008), also exists which has been viewed as a de jure measure and includes an important (and novel) set of 
regulatory measure.  We will later use this index as an indicator of financial market imperfection. To see 
whether this index can also be used as a measure of international capital mobility we conducted several 
experiments. We found that while the Chinn-Ito index had explanatory power in some instances (e.g., 
OECD) the results were not robust in the presence of the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti indices which did exhibit 
robustness. It therefore appears that the Chinn-Ito index may be a more suitable measure of financial 
market imperfection than of capital mobility. As mentioned, we will in fact use this measure in this latter 
sense to explain the FH puzzle in cross-sectional domain (see section 1.5). 
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for the other subgroups. The reason can be seen from the Figure 1.1 and especially Figure 
1.3. While Figure 1.1 simply establishes that both IFIGDP and GEQY variables have 
risen for the sample period for all groups (including our group of interest), Figure 1.3 
indicates that the FH coefficient for the upper-middle income groups has fallen more 
consistently and to a much larger extent, dropping from a high of 0.93 in 1973 to a low 
0.25 in 2009. By contrast, the trend of FH coefficient for OECDs is flatter. As for lower-
middle income countries, FH coefficient seems steady from 1988 to 2009, while for the 
low income countries, it actually increased slightly from about 0.2 to 0.35 during 1980 
and 2009. 
In sum, results from the panel regressions reaffirm the time series results and point to 
the viability of the FH coefficient as a measure of capital mobility when dynamics are 
considered. These results are consistent with Feldstein-Horioka's original hypothesis.
17
  
Considering the cross-sectional comparison, we must still explain why the FH 
coefficients for OECD (high income) economies are larger than those for lower income 
economies. One explanation that has been put forward is the size effect (Frankel, 1992; 
Baxter and Crucini, 1993). This is discussed in the following section. 
[Insert Table 1.5 here] 
1.4.3  Size Effect 
Frankel (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1993) proposed introducing country size as a 
way to explain the cross-country persistence of the FH puzzle. In this subsection, we re-
                                                          
17
 We also considered a natural experiment case, the adoption of euro. However, there is no evidence to 
support a significant structure break before and after the adoption. As most of Euro countries have 
decreasing FH coefficients, the finding does not support the case that the adoption of euro could lower the 
FH coefficients. 
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examine this effect, and show how it influences the viability of the FH coefficients as a 
measure of capital mobility across countries. This will provide the basis for our 
alternative explanation (Section 1.5). 
Frankel (1992) suggested that if the domestic economy is “large” in the world 
financial markets, then the world interest rate becomes endogenous. As such, a shortfall 
in domestic saving will drive up world interest rates, crowding out investment 
domestically as well as abroad. Baxter and Crucini (1993) construct a two-country, one-
good version of the standard neoclassical model, and find that the country size (measured 
by a fraction of world population) is an important determinant of saving-investment 
correlations. Their explanation is that large countries have larger effects on the world 
interest rate, and their model shows that for an arbitrarily large country, the correlation 
between true saving and investment is approximately 1. 
If size implies that saving and investment rates are highly correlated due to interest 
rate endogeneity, then FH coefficient is no longer suitable indicator of international 
capital market integration. To examine this issue and see how the size effect influences 
the FH coefficients, we adopt a cross-section regression with FH coefficient as the 
dependent variable and natural log of real GDP (lnRGDP), population (lnPOP) and real 
GDP per capita (lnGDPPC)--entered separately--as independent variables measuring 
country size effects. We also include as controls the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices 
(IFIGDP and GEQY), indicating international capital mobility. If the arguments of 
Frankel (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1993) are true, the estimators of the “size effect” 
measures should be positive, implying that larger countries experience higher saving-
investment correlations. 
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To construct our cross-sectional framework, we divide the full sample period (1973-
2009) into four time regimes (1973-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009) 
compute the mean value of the dependent and independent variables over time, and 
estimate a cross-sectional regression model within each time regime. The results show 
that, for all time regimes, the estimators for the size effect variables are positive and 
significant (Table 1.6). This finding is consistent with the argument by of Frankel (1992) 
and Baxter and Crucini (1993). Moreover, in most of the cases, we can observe that the 
estimators for the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices are insignificant and now only weakly 
related to the FH coefficient. This result implies that the size effect dominates the FH 
coefficients under the cross-sectional framework. It also implies that the FH puzzle in the 
domain of cross-sectional comparison still remains, making the interpretation of the FH 
coefficient more complex. In the next section, we provide a deeper discussion and a 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon. 
[Insert Table 1.6 here] 
1.5  Cross-sectional Explanation of the puzzle:  Financial Market 
Imperfection 
To sum up to this point, while in the dynamic time-series approach the FH coefficients 
and Lane-Milesi-Ferretti financial integration indices are highly negatively correlated for 
each country (and thus FH coefficient appears a suitable indicator of international capital 
mobility over time), across countries the story is different. Here, the FH coefficients are 
significantly affected by country size, and this is a more robust variable dominating the 
Lane-Milesi-Ferretti financial integration variables. 
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This brings us to the third and last contribution of the paper. In seeking to explain why 
FH coefficient fails to explain the capital mobility across countries, we look to the role of 
financial market imperfections, as a potential explanation. We hypothesize that 
departures from a deregulated capital market are why the FH coefficient may not reflect 
the true international mobility of capital and set out to examine this hypothesis. Several 
studies attempt to explain this “size effect” in terms of the behavior of investors and the 
environment of financial markets. For instance, the high correlation between saving and 
investment is attributed to “home bias” where capital is mobile but investors prefer to 
keep it at home (Feldstein, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000)
18
. Devereux (1996) argues 
that the higher correlation between saving and investment can be traced to tax policies 
that affect both simultaneously. Gunji (2003) introduces a proxy for the legal protection 
of investors, and finds that the countries with lower investor protection have a lower FH 
coefficient. This suggests that an increase of domestic saving may ﬂow out to countries 
with stronger investor protection, rather than into domestic investment. 
In light of this background we introduce an index of capital market imperfection. Two 
such indices are available in the literature; the Sachs-Warner index (Sachs and Warner, 
1995) which is a binary variable (0 is closed, 1 is opened) and thus somewhat limited in 
its usefulness, and a quantitative and more precise index, developed by Chinn and Ito 
(2008), which captures the “level” of openness, known by the authors as the KAOPEN 
index (described below). With one exception, we are not aware of any studies that use 
financial deregulation index in the FH context, and certainly none that use the more 
                                                          
18
 Other empirical and theoretical studies about the home bias can be found in Tesar and Werner (1995), 
Lewis (1999), and Gordon and Gaspar (2001). 
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precise KAOPEN index in this context.
19
 In this paper, we incorporate the KAOPEN 
index. KAOPEN is based on variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-
border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The index is the first standardized 
principal component of four categories of restrictions on external accounts. 
Our sample is the same as used earlier except that Luxemburg is dropped due to the 
missing value in the Chinn-Ito index. To focus on the cross-sectional variation in an 
effort to explain the FH puzzle in its cross-sectional dimension, we compute the average 
values of the KAOPEN index over time for each country for the four subgroups in our 
sample. These are normalized from 0 to 100 and increasing in the degree of capital 
market openness. Figure 1.4 presents the results averaged over each of four different 
decades. As expected, the index for the OECD economies is much higher than the rest of 
the sample, and also increasing over the past three decades. Generally, however, capital 
market openness has increased for all four groups. 
[Insert Figure 1.4 here] 
We now set up a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the probability 
( ) for significance of long-run estimates20 between the FH coefficient and the Lane and 
                                                          
19
 The exception is the Bahmani-Oskooee and Chakrabarti (2005) who use the Sachs-Warner index in a 
panel cointegration framework for a sample of 20 OECD and 106 non-OECD countries from 1960-2000 to 
examine whether the correlation between saving and investment is sensitive to the countries’ openness. 
They find that the relationship is significantly stronger in closed economies than in countries that are open 
after initial closure. However, as stated above a binary domain does not capture the “degree” of openness. 
Also, as the FH coefficients are estimated by a panel cointegration model, only a single estimator for the 
FH coefficient is produced, overlooking the dynamic property of international capital mobility. 
20
 Refer to Table 1.4 for the long-run estimates. 
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Milesi-Ferretti indices (IFIGDP and GEQY) and the KAOPEN index is the independent 
variable, as follows: 
  (
  
    
)                                                                 (1-8) 
where for each country i,    is the probability that the long-run coefficient between FH 
coefficient and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti indices is significantly negative, i.e.,  
               or             ;         is the capital market openness index 
averaged for time;       is the dummy index for OECD membership the dummy 
variable for OECD countries, to examine the robustness of results to the inclusion of this 
OECD. This logistic regression is preferable to the linear regression because it limits the 
probability between 0 and 1. 
What are the expected signs? We observe that since a lower FH coefficient implies 
higher capital mobility (the FH hypothesis) and a large value of IFIGDP and GEQY also 
indicate the same thing, it follows that when the long-run estimates are significantly 
negative, the FH coefficient is a more accurate measure of international capital mobility. 
Following this observation combined with the hypothesis that financial market 
imperfections are why FH puzzle arises, we would expect to observe the coefficient of 
KAOPEN, i.e.,   , to be significant and positive; that is, more deregulated economies are 
more likely to experience a better fit between the FH coefficient and capital mobility. 
Results are shown in Table 1.7. The coefficients of KAOPEN are positive and highly 
significant: less regulation (higher KAOPEN) accounts for a higher possibility of 
significantly negative long-run relationship between the FH coefficients and financial 
integration.  
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[Insert Table 1.7 here] 
1.6  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between two methods that have been used to 
measure the level of international capital mobility, Feldstein-Horioka method (Feldstein 
and Horioka, 1980) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) indices and examines the 
unusual finding, the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) offered a measure of international capital mobility based 
on the correlation between domestic saving and investment (FH coefficient), expecting a 
higher correlation to imply lower capital mobility and a lower correlation to imply higher 
mobility. Given the evidence of high correlation in OECD countries and low correlation 
in emerging countries, a so called “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” was born. 
In this paper, we have addressed this puzzle by moving away from cross country 
averages to capture the fluctuating properties of capital flow. By introducing the time-
varying-parameter (TVP) model, and stressing a dynamic view of the correlation of 
domestic saving and investment, we have found the FH coefficients are decreasing for 
most of the countries, no matter developing or developed. Does this mean that capital 
markets have become more integrated over time? 
To answer this we then compared the FH indicator of capital mobility to the widely 
used measure of international financial integration, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
indices, based on the IMF balance of payments statistics. The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) index indicated that indeed increased international financial integration has 
occurred over time. We found strong support for the relationship between the FH 
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coefficient and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti in ways that vindicates the original FH 
hypothesis and removes the FH puzzle in a dynamic perspective. However, we also find 
the existence of a size effect where the FH coefficients are generally higher for the larger 
countries, which are defined as higher population, real GDP or GDP per capita. In other 
words, although we find increasing international capital mobility per country over time, 
the cross-sectional comparison between countries still supports the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle. 
We offer a potential explanation for the persistence of FH puzzle between the 
countries: financial market imperfection. To examine this notion, we incorporate the 
KAOPEN index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) containing information on the level of 
deregulation. Results show that financial market imperfection affects the viability of FH 
coefficient as a measure of international capital mobility: in a well deregulated financial 
market, the FH coefficient is more likely to reveal the level of international capital 
mobility. 
By thus navigating the complex web of the FH hypothesis and FH puzzle and 
decoupling that into a dynamic and a cross sectional dimension we are able to address the 
puzzle dynamically, and find a salient and robust explanation for the puzzle across 
counties. 
Given the critical importance of saving and investment to both financial and goods 
markets and to fiscal, monetary and capital market policies, the significance of reviving 
the original and classic Feldstein Horioka hypothesis--both reaffirming it dynamically, 
and explaining where it may not hold statically-- cannot be overstated.  
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Table 1.1  Average Saving and Investment Rate 
 
Periods OECD Upper-mid Lower-mid Low Total 
Saving 
rate 
1970-79 
24.42 24.15 14.76 9.69 20.39 
(7.10) (11.75) (17.14) (11.11) (14.20) 
1980-89 
22.52 24.93 11.22 9.33 18.23 
(6.22) (9.95) (19.68) (6.47) (14.51) 
1990-99 
23.62 24.43 14.20 6.44 19.23 
(6.89) (9.97) (15.47) (9.91) (12.74) 
2000-09 
24.58 27.23 15.56 8.54 21.06 
(8.41) (13.16) (14.54) (6.58) (13.45) 
1970-2009 
23.79 25.19 13.94 9.69 19.83 
(7.23) (11.33) (16.87) (9.19) (13.78) 
Investment 
rate 
1970-79 
25.37 24.13 19.95 15.34 22.31 
(4.01) (9.15) (6.32) (7.67) (7.31) 
1980-89 
22.69 22.78 22.20 12.62 21.64 
(3.79) (6.73) (7.36) (4.54) (6.56) 
1990-99 
21.50 21.82 23.35 14.12 21.49 
(4.42) (6.20) (11.07) (5.30) (8.00) 
2000-09 
21.18 20.36 22.16 20.12 21.19 
(3.37) (3.66) (6.94) (5.73) (5.13) 
1970-2009 
22.68 22.27 21.92 15.56 21.66 
(4.25) (6.85) (8.22) (6.55) (6.84) 
Notes: 1. Countries are classified into four groups by the World Bank based on per capita income. 
           2. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.2  Correlation Coefficients of Investment Rate and Saving Rate 
OECD Upper-Middle Income Lower-Middle Income Low Income 
Country 
code 
  
Country 
code 
  
Country 
code 
  
Country 
code 
  
AUT 0.3811 BRA 0.6819 BOL 0.0829 GHA 0.0390 
BEL 0.7071 BWA -0.3704 CHN 0.8910 KEN 0.4765 
CAN 0.5077 CHL 0.6742 CIV 0.6463 MDG 0.6552 
CHE 0.6557 COL -0.0047 ECU 0.1846 RWA 0.2124 
DEU 0.4527 CRI 0.3617 EGY 0.6446 ZAR 0.6030 
DNK 0.0629 DOM 0.5076 GTM -0.1247 ZMB 0.6924 
ESP 0.6496 DZA -0.1524 HND 0.0385 
  
FIN 0.4575 GAB 0.2792 IND 0.9600 
  
FRA 0.7741 MEX 0.1449 LKA 0.2100 
  
GBR 0.6790 MYS 0.0718 LSO 0.0406 
  
GRC 0.7472 PER 0.5941 MAR 0.3276 
  
IRL -0.0366 TUR 0.8468 NIC -0.4213 
  
ISL 0.5130 URY 0.1703 PAK 0.2913 
  
ISR -0.4578 VEN 0.2744 PHL 0.5591 
  
ITA 0.6740 ZAF 0.7818 PNG -0.6001 
  
JPN 0.9672 
  
PRY 0.5076 
  
KOR 0.7207 
  
SEN 0.0396 
  
LUX 0.0296 
  
SLV 0.3653 
  
NLD 0.2437 
  
SWZ -0.0650 
  
NOR -0.2664 
  
SYR 0.0543 
  
PRT 0.5504 
  
THA 0.5777 
  
SWE 0.2669 
  
TUN 0.3232 
  
USA 0.5585 
      
OECD 0.4277 
Upper-
mid 
0.3241 
Lower-
mid 
0.2515 Low 0.4464 
Note: Countries are classified into four groups by the World Bank based on per capita income. 
  
 
 
Table 1.3  Panel Regression of Investment Rate on Saving Rate 
Independent 
variables 
All countries OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Low income 
Saving rate ((
 
 
)
  
) 
0.2049 
(0.0598)*** 
0.3317 
(0.0566)*** 
0.2727 
(0.0680)*** 
0.0957 
(0.0441)** 
0.6171 
(0.0829)*** 
   (
 
 
)
  
  
-0.1372 
(0.0598)*** 
-0.1019 
(0.0233)*** 
-0.1057 
(0.0496)* 
-0.1325 
(0.0643)* 
-0.3265 
(0.0911)** 
   (
 
 
)
  
  
-0.2499 
(0.0554)*** 
-0.1791 
(0.0409)*** 
-0.1649 
(0.1065) 
-0.2855 
(0.1538)* 
-0.4611 
(0.0897)*** 
   (
 
 
)
  
  
-0.3030 
(0.0406)*** 
-0.2250 
(0.0517)*** 
-0.2688 
(0.0874)*** 
-0.2643 
(0.0666)*** 
-0.2644 
(0.1294)* 
lnGDPPC 
4.7627 
(1.4172)*** 
4.3576 
(1.5445)** 
4.7996 
(3.5803) 
8.1886 
(1.9401)*** 
5.9802 
(2.7109)* 
lnPOP 
5.9526 
(1.9315)*** 
-8.3313 
(5.6013) 
-0.4817 
(4.3023) 
3.7830 
(3.0700) 
13.8837 
(4.1612)** 
Constant 
-115.0197 
(33.7576)*** 
111.4043 
(84.9972) 
-11.7896 
(70.5088) 
-94.7321 
(50.1706)* 
-250.1815 
(81.8544)** 
   (within) 0.1648 0.3751 0.2922 0.1682 0.5336 
Obs. 2680 920 600 880 240 
Notes: 1. Countries are classified into four groups by the World Bank based on per capita income. 
 2. The panel regressions are country fixed effect models. 
 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 4. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 1.4  Long-run Coefficient Estimates 
Group Country 
Equation (1-4) Equation (1-5) 
          F statistic               F statistic       
OECD 
AUT 
-0.0410 
 (-5.9085)***  
4.1743** 
-0.2499 
 (2.8808)***  
-0.1024 
(3.6523)*** 
2.4480 
-0.1663 
 (2.1774)** 
BEL 
-0.0067 
(7.1363)*** 
9.1967*** 
-0.8013 
 (4.3810)*** 
-0.0093 
(3.5373)*** 
75.2052*** 
-0.9255 
(12.4727)*** 
CAN 
-0.2350 
(18.5249)*** 
7.3312***   
-0.5112 
(3.8728)*** 
-0.2950 
(15.0420)*** 
4.0528** 
-0.3261 
(2.8930)*** 
CHE 
-0.0337 
(5.2011)*** 
3.3429**  
-0.2511 
(2.6283)** 
-0.0678 
(5.6069)*** 
4.0395** 
-0.3103 
(2.8889)*** 
DEU 
-0.1129 
(2.8030)*** 
1.8265 
-0.1316 
(1.9317)* 
-0.3160 
(1.6316) 
1.0613 
-0.0905 
(1.4616) 
DNK 
-0.0732 
(4.5910)*** 
3.6876**  
-0.2755 
(2.7097)** 
-0.1675 
(4.8707)*** 
3.0442* 
-0.2310 
(2.5002)** 
ESP 
0.0519 
(1.6941) 
2.9380* 
-0.1875 
(2.4631)** 
0.1509 
(1.6401) 
3.0278* 
-0.1833 
(2.5005)** 
FIN 
-0.0470 
(4.7151)*** 
1.6391 
-0.1636 
(1.8426)* 
-0.0582 
(1.2986) 
1.8312 
-0.1074 
(1.9406)* 
FRA 
0.0167 
(0.3728) 
3.3305** 
-0.0671 
(2.5043)** 
0.0142 
(0.1437) 
3.2922** 
-0.0715 
(2.4605)** 
GBR 
0.0193 
(1.8517)* 
9.7388*** 
-0.2627 
(4.4627)*** 
0.0452 
(1.6462) 
8.0122*** 
-0.2602 
(4.0686)*** 
GRC 
-0.1310 
(0.3862) 
0.8381 
-0.0871 
(1.2841) 
-0.2843 
(0.1289) 
0.7930 
-0.0770 
(1.2768) 
IRL 
0.0030 
(0.3600) 
6.0966*** 
-0.1551 
(3.5127)*** 
0.0072 
(0.2975) 
6.7767*** 
-0.1577 
(3.7122)*** 
ISL 
-1.3674 
(1.8076)* 
2.2978 
-0.1459 
(2.0356)* 
226.6350 
(0.0331) 
2.1397 
0.0030 
(2.1174)** 
ISR 
0.0193 
(2.0486)* 
9.7488***  
-0.3057 
(4.4914)*** 
0.0169 
(1.1130) 
9.6899*** 
-0.2919 
(4.4609)*** 
ITA 
0.0518 
(0.1939) 
1.4169 
-0.0628 
(1.7084)* 
0.8998 
(0.22389) 
1.3608 
-0.0280 
(1.6528) 
JPN 
-0.0709 
(3.9953)*** 
4.5412** 
-0.4198 
(3.0630)*** 
-0.1892 
(2.2193)** 
3.7806** 
-0.2624 
(2.7492)*** 
KOR 
-0.3665 
(2.2478)** 
9.2506*** 
-0.4067 
(4.3154)*** 
-0.1566 
(0.6286) 
2.7894* 
-0.2731 
(2.3974)** 
NLD 
-0.0275 
(1.7594)* 
2.8386* 
-0.1806 
(2.4111)** 
-0.0596 
(1.4814) 
2.6256* 
-0.1679 
(2.3146)** 
NOR 
0.4722 
(0.8575) 
3.8553** 
-0.0770 
(2.7822)** 
1.1100 
(1.1529) 
7.5165*** 
-0.1389 
(3.9300)*** 
PRT 
0.0037 
(1.6857) 
16.3933*** 
-0.3246 
(5.7852)*** 
0.0130 
(1.7404)* 
16.5882*** 
-0.3247 
(5.8380)*** 
SWE 
-0.0062 
(1.1863) 
8.9837*** 
-0.2310 
(4.3136)*** 
-0.0117 
(1.2890) 
9.0314*** 
-0.2309 
(4.3252)*** 
USA 
-0.0202 
(0.3457) 
1.0292 
-0.0618 
(1.4430) 
-0.0672 
(0.4294) 
0.9474 
-0.0595 
(1.3985) 
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Table 1.4  Long-run Coefficient Estimates (continued) 
Group Country 
Equation (1-4) Equation (1-5) 
          F statistic               F statistic       
Upper-
Middle 
Income 
BRA 
-0.6200 
(2.4508)** 
7.4110*** 
-0.2312 
(3.8768)*** 
-0.3681 
(1.5215) 
2.3003 
-0.1781 
(2.1600)** 
BWA 
-0.3804 
(1.3567) 
2.4799  
-0.1264 
(2.1603)** 
0.2461 
(0.4259) 
5.6443*** 
-0.1851 
(3.1837)*** 
CHL 
-0.1619 
(1.2386) 
1.3994 
-0.1359 
(1.7106) 
-0.3283 
(1.4359) 
6.3104*** 
-0.1633 
(3.6403)*** 
COL 
-0.1385 
(0.9172) 
3.2021* 
-0.1311 
(2.5689)** 
0.2117 
(0.5016) 
3.2630** 
-0.1179 
(2.5811)** 
CRI 
-0.3453 
(0.7367) 
5.6311** 
-0.2276 
(3.3332)*** 
8.8213 
(0.6437) 
12.9691*** 
-0.1029 
(4.6230)*** 
DOM 
-1.5530 
(0.9384) 
6.1173*** 
-0.0864 
(1.6049) 
-3.0337 
(1.0242) 
7.6269*** 
-0.1286 
(2.7602)*** 
DZA 
2.3645 
(0.3654) 
2.2494 
-0.0300 
(2.1709)** 
47.5341 
(0.4035) 
4.5414** 
-0.0234 
(3.0759)*** 
GAB 
-0.0319 
(0.0288) 
0.6722 
-0.0496 
(1.1755) 
1.6675 
(1.1944) 
0.8794 
-0.0741 
(1.3458) 
MEX 
-1.8085 
(4.9193)*** 
4.8396 
-0.2055 
(3.1780)*** 
0.2536 
(0.2046) 
5.5696*** 
-0.1740 
(3.3988)*** 
MYS 
-0.5433 
(5.2319)*** 
7.7789*** 
-0.3631 
(3.8611)*** 
-1.0663 
(5.0795)*** 
4.5171** 
-0.2913 
(3.0677)*** 
PER 
0.2923 
(0.6409) 
2.3864 
-0.2946 
(2.2361)** 
0.2149 
(0.5968) 
2.7610* 
-0.2322 
(2.3365)** 
TUR 
-0.8166 
(4.6765)*** 
6.1890*** 
-0.4691 
(3.5717)*** 
-1.3584 
(1.1367) 
5.0735** 
-0.5795 
(3.2604)*** 
URY 
-0.1890 
(4.0778)*** 
20.2213*** 
-0.6210 
(6.3757)*** 
-1.7599 
(2.9674)*** 
8.1212*** 
-0.4839 
(4.1250)*** 
VEN 
-1.0760 
(12.3404)*** 
8.0530***    
-0.6877 
(4.1123)*** 
-0.2038 
(0.1279) 
1.1330 
-0.1014 
(1.4853) 
ZAF 
0.0735 
(0.6490) 
2.0408 
-0.0972 
(2.0108)* 
0.0959 
(0.6886) 
2.1154 
-0.0982 
(2.0090)* 
Lower-
Middle 
Income 
BOL 
-0.2265 
(0.8753) 
 3.8807**  
-0.1966 
(2.7950)*** 
-0.3134 
(1.8091)* 
10.9078*** 
-0.2925 
(4.7274)*** 
CHN 
-0.0005 
(0.0481) 
8.9040*** 
-1.0766 
(4.3087)*** 
0.0113 
(0.5195) 
7.6075*** 
-1.1022 
(3.9756)*** 
CIV 
-0.7415 
(4.6333)*** 
5.3937*** 
-0.2687 
(2.9700)*** 
-1.0694 
(0.6321) 
1.4602 
-0.1428 
(1.7362)* 
ECU 
-0.2284 
(6.6924)*** 
5.9248*** 
-0.3112 
(3.5197)*** 
0.9967 
(0.9114) 
13.6032*** 
-0.1687 
(3.4523)*** 
EGY 
-0.0396 
(0.6588) 
32.3516*** 
-0.3641 
(8.2097)*** 
-0.0501 
(0.3947) 
9.9964*** 
-0.3722 
(4.5766)*** 
GTM 
-1.6733 
(3.1585)*** 
3.0065* 
-0.2089 
(2.2238)** 
-3.6252 
(0.6905) 
1.2443 
-0.0969 
(1.5964) 
HND 
-0.0969 
(1.6069) 
11.3483*** 
-0.2258 
(4.8207)*** 
-0.1818 
(2.1910)* 
15.2805*** 
-0.4488 
(5.6247)*** 
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Table 1.4  Long-run Coefficient Estimates (continued) 
Group Country 
Equation (1-4) Equation (1-5) 
          F statistic               F statistic       
Lower-
Middle 
Income 
IND 
0.2821 
(0.9075) 
2.2554 
-0.0960 
(2.1016)** 
0.2756 
(0.6757) 
2.1397 
-0.1011 
(2.0586)** 
LKA 
-0.4394 
(1.0967) 
7.2565*** 
-0.2208 
(3.7310)*** 
1.8303 
(1.5325) 
8.1076*** 
-0.1810 
(4.0674)*** 
LSO 
0.1208 
(3.0899)*** 
 4.1957** 
-0.3379 
(2.8252)*** 
0.1768 
(2.7663)** 
4.1330** 
-0.3604 
(2.9143)*** 
MAR 
-0.0371 
(1.3192) 
17.8970*** 
-0.6912 
(6.0571)*** 
-0.0260 
(1.4037) 
18.2905*** 
-0.6163 
(6.1658)*** 
NIC 
-0.0764 
(3.6090)*** 
 4.9194** 
-0.3219 
(3.1375)*** 
0.1826 
(0.2599) 
1.7466 
-0.1537 
(1.8061)* 
PAK 
-1.2350 
(2.1649)** 
2.3819 
-0.2580 
(2.1979)** 
7.5373 
(0.0913) 
0.9326 
-0.0115 
(0.6534) 
PHL 
-4.2749 
(0.8326) 
5.4224*** 
-0.0402 
(3.3478)*** 
-3.5315 
(4.4201)*** 
6.7683*** 
-0.2703 
(3.7658)*** 
PNG 
0.1766 
(0.2734) 
35.0269*** 
-0.7660 
(7.0571)*** 
0.4039 
(0.5196) 
33.0443*** 
-0.8432 
(7.5948)*** 
PRY 
-0.4692 
(1.0182) 
1.2218 
-0.0848 
(1.5702) 
1.1004 
(0.3475) 
1.0136 
-0.0520 
(1.4024) 
SEN 
-0.1514 
(4.1463)*** 
42.8261*** 
-0.4731 
(9.3964)*** 
-0.4893 
(1.6396) 
30.8955*** 
-0.3380 
(7.9032)*** 
SLV 
-0.5867 
(4.2873)*** 
5.1582** 
-0.2660 
(2.9258)*** 
-0.9206 
(1.1918) 
1.9933 
-0.1414 
(1.9917)* 
SWZ 
-0.3389 
(1.1164) 
2.3738 
-0.3090 
(2.2111)** 
-1.5281 
(1.8922)* 
3.3745** 
-0.3752 
(2.6263)** 
SYR 
-0.0571 
(1.0470) 
2.1250 
-0.1804 
(2.1041)** 
-0.8349 
(2.6921)** 
1.3521 
-0.2242 
(1.4640) 
THA 
-0.4596 
(2.1639)** 
1.5507 
-0.1787 
(1.7722)* 
-1.1225 
(3.0588)*** 
4.7486** 
-0.3283 
(3.1510)*** 
TUN 
-0.3400 
(5.4660)*** 
36.5138*** 
-0.6375 
(8.5880)*** 
-0.5690 
(4.4635)*** 
31.0069*** 
-0.5581 
(7.9182)*** 
Low 
Income 
GHA 
-0.2170 
(1.1494) 
2.4701 
-0.1876 
(2.2705)** 
-2.0143 
(2.2725)** 
3.8930** 
-0.2354 
(2.7676)*** 
KEN 
0.1143 
(0.5262) 
2.6046 
-0.3211 
(2.3387)** 
1.5971 
(2.4027)** 
18.4970*** 
-0.5678 
(6.1977)*** 
MDG 
-0.1395 
(1.5639) 
10.5730***     
-0.5472 
(4.6779)*** 
0.2595 
(0.6746) 
9.7311*** 
-0.4215 
(4.4221)*** 
RWA 
0.2181 
(2.1259)** 
2.7140* 
-0.2053 
(2.3779)** 
3.6106 
(0.4353) 
0.2206 
-0.0357 
(0.6779) 
ZAR 
0.0754 
(0.7800) 
3.5117** 
-0.2913 
(2.6016)** 
2.2155 
(1.3177) 
3.7650** 
-0.2810 
(2.7859)*** 
ZMB 
0.2054 
(6.4656) 
15.3814*** 
-0.3652 
(5.6608)*** 
0.3984 
(2.8633)*** 
2.6386* 
-0.2607 
(2.3513)** 
Notes: 1. T statistics are in parentheses. 
 2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 1.5  Panel Regression of FH Coefficient on Lane-Milesi-Ferretti Indices 
 
All Countries OECD 
IFIGDP 
-0.0359 
(0.0027)*** 
-0.0228 
(0.0028)***   
-0.0255 
(0.0020)*** 
0.0002 
(0.0023) 
 
 
GEQY 
  
-0.0833 
(0.0079)*** 
-0.0323 
(0.0086)*** 
 
 
-0.0706 
(0.0055)*** 
0.0012 
(0.0062) 
lnGDPPC 
 
-0.2227 
(0.0174)***  
-0.2403 
(0.0185)*** 
 -0.3839 
(0.0215)*** 
 -0.3851 
(0.0218)*** 
Constant 
0.5224 
(0.0059)*** 
2.2866 
(0.1378)*** 
0.5031 
(0.0054)*** 
2.4100 
(0.1470)*** 
0.7212 
(0.0070)*** 
4.4260 
(0.2078)*** 
0.7109 
(0.0064)*** 
4.4380 
(0.2115)*** 
R
2
(within) 0.0688 0.1302 0.0454 0.1103 0.1646 0.4044 0.1701 0.4044 
Obs. 2394 2394 2376 2376 814 814 814 814 
 
Upper-middle Income Lower-middle Income 
IFIGDP -0.3860 
(0.0282)***  
-0.3234 
(0.0314)*** 
  
-0.0696 
(0.0082)***  
-0.0659 
(0.0080)***   
GEQY 
  
-0.4001 
(0.0558)***  
-0.1894 
(0.0641)***   
-0.2086 
(0.0461)***  
-0.1122 
(0.0504)** 
lnGDPPC 
 
-0.1827 
(0.0424)*** 
 
-0.3003 
(0.0493)***  
-0.1709 
(0.0309)***  
-0.1592 
(0.0358)*** 
Constant 0.7883 
(0.0284)***  
2.2040 
(0.3302)*** 
0.5282 
(0.0181)***  
2.8978 
(0.3892)*** 
0.4201 
(0.0121)***  
1.5779 
(0.2095)*** 
0.3918 
(0.0133)***  
1.4544 
(0.2390)*** 
R
2
(within) 0.2578 0.2826 0.0874 0.1465 0.0853  0.1199 0.0261  0.0507 
Obs. 554 554 553 553 804  804 787 787 
 
Low Income     
IFIGDP 
-0.0548 
(0.0214)**  
-0.0516 
(0.0284)*       
GEQY 
  
0.1502 
(0.0920)  
0.2156 
(0.0951)**     
lnGDPPC 
 
0.0124 
(0.0705)  
0.1324 
(0.0555)**     
Constant 
0.3913 
(0.0284)***  
0.3178 
(0.4190) 
0.2912 
(0.0256)***  
-0.4688 
(0.3195)     
R
2
(within) 0.0295  0.0297 0.0122  0.0378     
Obs. 222  222 222  222     
 Notes: 1. The panel regressions are fixed effect models over countries. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 1.6  Cross-section Regression of FH Coefficient on Size Effect 
1973
-
1979 
IFIGDP 
-0.0845 
(0.0795) 
-0.0362 
(0.0916) 
-0.1643 
(0.0840)*    
GEQY 
   
-0.3608 
(0.1973)* 
-0.3160 
(0.2552) 
-0.4946 
(0.1996)** 
lnRGDP 
0.0554 
(0.0153)***   
0.0538 
(0.0147)***   
lnPOP 
 
0.0401 
(0.0201)*   
0.0363 
(0.0191)*  
lnGDPPC 
  
0.0834 
(0.0223)***   
0.0763 
(0.0222)*** 
Constant 
-0.5390 
(0.3837) 
0.1139 
(0.3613) 
0.1913 
(0.1846) 
-0.5065 
(0.3678) 
0.1941 
(0.3336) 
0.2059 
(0.1795) 
R2 0.2108 0.0620 0.2088 0.2371 0.0918 0.2287 
Obs. 62 62 62 62 62 62 
1980
-
1989 
IFIGDP 
-0.0439 
(0.0479) 
-0.0203 
(0.0693) 
-0.1237 
(0.0454)***    
GEQY 
   
-0.0526 
(0.1786) 
0.1003 
(0.2496) 
-0.2891 
(0.1651)* 
lnRGDP 
0.0846 
(0.0128)***   
0.0853 
(0.0130)***   
lnPOP 
 
0.0486 
(0.0255)*   
0.0537 
(0.0254)**  
lnGDPPC 
  
0.1253 
(0.0177)***   
0.1217 
(0.0201)*** 
Constant 
-1.5243 
(0.3336)*** 
-0.2911 
(0.4584) 
-0.3749 
(0.1586)** 
-1.5796 
(0.3247)*** 
-0.4131 
(0.4430) 
-0.4261 
(0.1615)** 
R2 0.4058 0.0788 0.4313 0.3961 0.0807 0.3820 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 
1990
-
1999 
IFIGDP 
0.0116 
(0.0273) 
0.0344 
(0.0416) 
-0.0183 
(0.0293)    
GEQY 
   
0.0583 
(0.0617) 
0.2111 
(0.0689)*** 
-0.0079 
(0.0744) 
lnRGDP 
0.0851 
(0.0112)***   
0.0827 
(0.0114)***   
lnPOP 
 
0.0743 
(0.0241)***   
0.0757 
(0.0246)***  
lnGDPPC 
  
0.0930 
(0.0215)***   
0.0909 
(0.0230)*** 
Constant 
-1.7088 
(0.2785)*** 
-0.8804 
(0.4215)** 
-0.3167 
(0.1729)* 
-1.6543 
(0.2833)*** 
-0.9281 
(0.4207)** 
-0.3242 
(0.1830)* 
R2 0.3707 0.1387 0.2335 0.3738 0.1905 0.2289 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 
2000
-
2009 
IFIGDP 
0.0185 
(0.0095)* 
0.0358 
(0.0144)** 
0.0121 
(0.0109)    
GEQY 
   
0.0473 
(0.0226)** 
0.0954 
(0.0332)*** 
0.0311 
(0.0272) 
lnRGDP 
0.0610 
(0.0099)***   
0.0608 
(0.0099)***   
lnPOP 
 
0.0689 
(0.0149)***   
0.0668 
(0.0159)***  
lnGDPPC 
  
0.0575 
(0.0217)**   
0.0580 
(0.0215)*** 
Constant 
-1.2264 
(0.2392)*** 
-0.8998 
(0.2543)*** 
-0.1598 
(0.1607) 
-1.2139 
(0.2425)*** 
-0.8555 
(0.2680)*** 
-0.1598 
(0.1617) 
R2 0.3509 0.2646 0.2052 0.3438 0.2546 0.2028 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
  
40 
 
    
 
 
Table 1.7  Logistic Regression Results for Financial Market Imperfection 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
  
  
          
 
  
  
       
Model I II III IV 
KAOPEN 
0.6307 
(0.2404)*** 
0.9306 
(0.3549)** 
0.4091 
(0.2476)* 
0.7650 
(0.3844)** 
OECD  
-0.9877 
(0.8335) 
 
-1.1722 
(0.9423) 
Constant 
-0.5510 
(0.2771)** 
-0.2824 
(0.3561) 
-1.2440  
(0.3135)*** 
-0.9474 
(0.3821)** 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0884 0.1054 0.0386 0.0614 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
     
 
Appendix A:  
Graphical Representation of FH Coefficient Estimates 
        
           Figure A-1 FH Coefficients for OECD Countries                    Figure A-2 FH Coefficients for Upper-middle Income Countries 
      
Figure A-3 FH Coefficients for Lower-middle Income Countries                 Figure A-4 FH Coefficients for Low Income Countries 
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Appendix B:  
Table B-1  Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) Panel Unit-root Test 
Samples Variables Levels First differences 
Whole countries 
I/Y -3.8506 (0.0001)*** 
 
S/Y -5.6292 (0.0000)*** 
 
     -8.5842 (0.0000)***  
IFIGDP 8.9090 (1.0000) -27.7682 (0.0000)*** 
GEQY 15.8811 (1.0000) -28.6742 (0.0000)*** 
OECD 
I/Y -1.6320 (0.0513)* 
 
S/Y -2.2636 (0.0118)** 
 
     -3.1035 (0.0010)***  
IFIGDP 15.3725 (1.0000) -15.9048 (0.0000)*** 
GEQY 10.4262 (1.0000) -17.4164 (0.0000)*** 
Upper-middle 
income 
I/Y -3.2715 (0.0005)*** 
 
S/Y -3.3306 (0.0004)*** 
 
     -3.3622 (0.0004)***  
IFIGDP 0.7120 (0.7618) -13.6495 (0.0000)*** 
GEQY 8.4106 (1.0000) -14.3156 (0.0000)*** 
Lower-middle 
income 
I/Y -2.0282 (0.0213)** 
 
S/Y -2.3355 (0.0098)*** 
 
     -7.6364 (0.0000)***  
IFIGDP -0.8572 (0.1957) -16.4265 (0.0000)*** 
GEQY 7.4420 (1.0000) -15.8235 (0.0000)*** 
Low-income 
I/Y -0.4923 (0.3112) -9.2247 (0.0000)*** 
S/Y -4.4551 (0.0000)*** 
 
     -2.3727 (0.0088)*** 
 
IFIGDP -0.2826 (0.3887) -7.9619 (0.0000)*** 
GEQY 4.5890 (1.0000) -8.0525 (0.0000)*** 
Note: 1. t-statistics are in the table. P-values are in parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
Financial Integration, Risk Diversification, and Growth 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The degree of financial integration has improved over the past several decades. There 
is a substantial literature discussing the effect of financial integration on economic 
growth or welfare.  One of the key channels through which financial integration is 
considered to benefit economic growth is the channel of risk-sharing (Prasad et. al., 2003). 
Intuitively, while savers are risk averse, higher-return projects entail higher risk than 
lower-return projects. As such, financial market integration, by facilitating diversification 
of risk, induces a portfolio shift toward projects that earn higher expected returns 
(Obstfeld, 1994). 
This paper is closely related to Obstfeld (1994) which supposes that each country can 
invest in two projects, riskless and risky. By developing a continuous-time stochastic 
model, Obstfeld (1994) shows the international risk diversification can yield welfare 
gains through its effect on expected consumption growth by allowing the world portfolio 
to shift from safe lower return capital to riskier higher return capital. Other papers have 
also evaluated the welfare gains from international risk-sharing. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) and Martin and Viktoria (2007) find the existence of gains 
from international risk-sharing, but the effect is not significant. van Wincoop (1999) and 
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Kim et al. (2003) suggest that the welfare gains vary with the degree of relative risk 
aversion, the stochastic process of endowment and the persistence of economic shock. 
Although it is generally assumed that financial integration stabilizes financial market, 
and creates the opportunity for risk diversification, the contagion effect of the financial 
crises in the recent decades draws the attention to the “cost” of financial integration. With 
a higher level of financial integration, financial crisis is no longer confined to a country 
or a region. Financial integration not only creates valuable opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, risk sharing, and intertemporal trade, it also causes a potential drawback 
by fostering systemic risk (through the “contagion” of the failure of one part of the 
integrated financial system) (Eichengreen et al., 1998; Williamson, 1998; Stiglitz, 2010). 
Some previous papers provide theoretical frameworks to address this issue. Fecht and 
Grüner (2005) consider a two-regional case, and derive the interbank market structure to 
illustrate the trade-off between the benefit from diversification and the cost from the 
contagion effect (increase in systemic risk). Daniel et al. (2007) develop a dynamic, 
small-open economy, general-equilibrium model that shows that financial liberalization 
contributes to banking crises. Fecht et al. (2012) study the relationship between financial 
integration and financial stability. They construct a model which incorporates the 
integrated interbank market, and allows the bank’s loan portfolios to adjust endogenously. 
In their model, banks can diversify the idiosyncratic risk from the integrated interbank 
market. They find the need for risk sharing increases the risk of cross-border contagion 
and the likelihood of widespread banking crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) 
and Boyd, et al. (2010) provide some empirical evidence that financial liberalization 
increase the likelihood of bank crises. 
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In contrast, some of the empirical findings claim that financial liberalization does not 
elevate the probability of bank crises. Bonfiglioli and Mendicino (2004) find the 
correlation between the occurrence of banking crises and the capital flow restrictions is 
unclear in 90 countries from 1975 to 1999. Moreover, capital account liberalization 
mitigates the harmful effects of the banking crises. In 69 developing countries from 1975 
to 1997, Glick et al. (2006) find that countries with fewer restrictions on capital flows 
experience a smaller probability of currency crises than the countries with more 
restrictions. The empirical analysis by De Nicolò and Luciana (2010) indicates that 
higher levels of financial integration predict lower levels of systemic real risk, and the 
prediction is stronger in the emerging markets. Angkinand et al. (2010) show the inverted 
U-shape relationship between the financial liberalization and the probability of banking 
risk in 48 countries from 1973 to 2005. By separating the sample, they find that the 
probability of banking crises is reduced with the higher level of financial liberalization, 
except the countries with weaker regulation and supervision. Enowbi Batuo and Mlambo 
(2012) study the effect of financial liberalization on banking crises within African 
countries from 1985 to 2010. The result shows that the financial liberalization tends to 
reduce the likelihood of banking crises. 
One reason for the contrast results between theoretical and empirical findings is the 
complexity of data. As discussed before, the effects of financial integration on growth 
have two directions, positive effect through the channel of risk-sharing and negative 
effect through the channel of contagion effect. The empirical data for bank crisis is 
influenced by these two effects simultaneously which are difficult to identify individually.  
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Rather than focus on the bank crisis, we are more interested in economic growth in 
the content of financial integration. Instead of focusing the benefit of risk-sharing and the 
effect on bank crisis in the previous empirical and theoretical studies, this paper provides 
the linkage between systemic risk and economic growth which contains fruitful intuitions, 
and sheds the light on the missing gap in the previous studies on systemic risk. 
To illustrate the benefit of risk diversification and the cost of systemic risk under the 
integrated financial market, this paper focuses on the volatilities of the risky investments, 
and provides a framework to show the effect of volatilities on portfolio decision and 
expected consumption growth. To address the issue of systemic risk, we consider the 
extent of correlation of risk between domestic and foreign investment (Stiglitz, 2010). To 
motivate the construction of our model, we look at the stylized fact on the relationship 
between systemic risk and growth. Based on the WDI data from the World Bank, we 
compute the correlation coefficient of risk premium (lending rate minus treasury bill rate) 
between each individual country and the world average for 69 countries from 1995 to 
2011, and show the relationship between correlation coefficient and the average 
consumption growth in Figure 2.1. Since the correlation coefficient of risk premium is 
considered to be the measure of systemic risk (Stiglitz, 2010), Figure 2.1 shows a 
negative relationship between the levels of systemic risk and consumption growth
1
, and 
shed the light on the potential cost of contagion effect from financial integration . 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
                                                          
1
 The negative effect of correlation on consumption growth is statistically significant in Figure 2.1. Similar 
result could be shown by using the growth of GDP per capita. 
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The theoretical model in this paper is closely related to Obstfeld (1994). However, 
Obstfeld (1994) only considered one risky investment, and unable to addresses the issue 
of systemic risk which is caused by international financial integration. For the purpose of 
investigating the effects of systemic risk, we identify risky investments into two sectors, 
domestic and foreign. In other words, we suppose that each individual can invest in three 
projects, risk-free investment, domestic risky investment and foreign risky investment, 
and determine the share for each project. The risk-free investment provides a constant 
return. The risky projects which may correlate with each other provide different expected 
returns and volatilities, and the relationship between domestic and foreign risky 
investments is the key to address the contagion effect in our model. The goal of this paper 
is to find out how the international portfolio is affected by the rate of returns, the 
volatilities of these risky assets, and the correlation between domestic and foreign 
investments. Moreover, this paper sheds the light on the growth of expected 
consumptions which is also affected by the returns and risks. 
Section 2.2 describes the model and evaluates the optimal portfolio and expected 
consumption growth. In section 2.3, we discuss the effects of volatilities and correlation 
on investment portfolio and growth. Section 2.4 shows a numerical example. The last 
section provides the concluding remarks. 
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2.2  The Model 
Suppose that the representative agent has an infinite-horizon expected utility function 
given by 
     {∑  
        
 
   }              (2-1) 
where the population is normalized to 1. We assume a linear technology with constant 
returns to scale in capital at the firm level, the AK model. There are three types of capital 
can be invested from domestic savings and offer different levels of return: 
1) Constant riskless gross return,   
2) Domestic risky return at time t,        
3) World risky return at time t,        
where        and        are i.i.d., and   (      )    and   (      )   . Capital can 
be moved from riskless and risky production, and vice versa, instantaneously and with no 
frictional costs. 
For the capital inflow,    denotes the international debt which is restricted by a 
constant fraction ( ) of total capital stock   . In each period t, the economy needs to 
repay the interest according to the world interest rate which is equal to the domestic risky 
return,     . Let    denotes to total amount of capital accumulated by the end of period t-1. 
The representative agent’s budget constraint is, 
     {              (      )      [           ]}                  
      {              (      )      [           ]            }      
 (2-2) 
where    represents the transaction cost.     implies there is no transaction cost. 
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  represents the fraction of total capital stock which is used for international 
borrowing 
     is the share of capital invested in riskless asset on the end of date t-1 
     is the share of capital invested in domestic risky asset on the end of date t-1 
     is the share of capital invested in world risky asset on the end of date t-1 
                          
The stochastic intertemporal maximization problem
2
 becomes, 
          {∑  
        
 
   }  
                 {              (      )      [           ]     
       }       
                    
   {              (      )      [           ]            }   is the 
value of total resources at the start of time t, and 
     {                  (        )        [             ]     
         }         
Since ∑     
 
    ∑       
 
                          then, 
      {            (        )        [             ]  
 [             ]}                                                        (2-3) 
Let        denotes the value function at the start of time t. This value function 
depends on the value of total resources at time t,  , and time t information if current and 
                                                          
2
 This formulation, though generalized presently, is based on the framework that Obstfeld (1994) and 
Obstfeld (1996) provide. 
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past asset returns contain useful information for predicting future returns. The Bellman 
equation for time t is, 
                   (             ({            (        )  
      [             ]   [             ]}       ))   
The first-order conditions, 
1) 
       
   
    
           ( 
       {            (        )        [            
 ]   [             ]})                                             (2-4) 
2) 
       
       
    
   [ 
       (        )]                                                         (2-5) 
3) 
       
       
    
   [ 
       [             ]]                                            (2-6) 
We specifying the utility function, that           . This utility function exhibits the 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion (         ⁄ ) equal to 1. While more complex 
forms can also be used to model risk aversion, this functional form is adequately 
consistent with the existence of risky investments. Obsfeld (1996, pp. 479) uses this same 
form as well. We presume the optimal consumption function has the proportional form, 
                                                                                 (2-7) 
where   is a constant. 
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From the first-order conditions (equation (2-4) to (2-6)), we can solve for  , and the 
utility function can be written as, 
                                                                                                  (2-8) 
The stochastic Euler conditions are as follow, 
     (
  
    
[                       ])  
    (
  
    
)  
             (
  
    
          )
                   (      )
                                                             (2-9) 
     (
  
    
[                ])  
    (
  
    
)  
              (
  
    
          )
            (      )
                                                          (2-10) 
     (
  
    
[                                 ])  
    (
  
    
)  
             (
  
    
          )                (
  
    
          )
            (      )                   (      )
             (2-11) 
We apply the result of Taylor approximation
3
 on equation (2-9),  
    (
  
    
)  
             (
    
  
          )
                   (      )
                                                           (2-12) 
Substituting equation (2-12) and the result of Taylor approximation, the covariance 
between consumption growth and risky returns can be written as a function of expected 
returns, parameters of capital inflow, transaction cost and time preferences.  
    (
    
  
          )  
  (      )  
            
                                  (2-13) 
    (
    
  
          )  
  (      ) 
 
     
            
                                (2-14) 
                                                          
3
 The detailed specification of Taylor approximation is in appendix A. 
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Note that, from equation (2-3) and (2-8), we have, 
    
  
 
    
  
  
 
    
  
 {            (        )        [             ]  
 [             ]}                              (2-15) 
Suppose the optimal share variables are   
  and   
  which are constant with i.i.d. risky 
returns. According to (2-15), we can derive     (      ⁄        )  and     (      ⁄  
      ) in terms of   
  and   
 , where 
    (
    
  
          )       (      )  
            (             )  
  
           (      )                                         (2-16) 
    (
    
  
          )       (             )  
            (      )  
  
           (             )                             (2-17) 
From equations (2-13), (2-14), (2-16) and (2-17), we can solve for the fraction of 
domestic and foreign risky investments (  
  and   
 ). 
   
  
        
  [         ]
                               (2-18) 
   
  
        
       [         ]
                                    (2-19) 
where     [  (      )   ]  
  [  (      )  
 
   
]  
   [         ]  
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        (             )  
By taking the expectation on both side of equation (2-15), we can obtain the expected 
consumption growth which contains   
  and   
 . 
  (
    
  
)
 
 {        
 [  (      )   ]    
 [       (      )   ]  
 [       (      )   ]}   
or, 
  (
    
  
)
 
               
      
          
 [         ]
                    (2-20) 
Equation (2-18), (2-19) and (2-20) represent the share of domestic risky investments, 
foreign risky investment, and expected consumption growth under the individual 
optimization (maximizing investor’s life time utility subject to budget constraints) 
respectively, and are depended on the returns and variances of domestic and foreign risky 
assets, and the covariance between domestic and foreign returns. 
2.3  Risk, Portfolio and Consumption Growth 
In this section, we will discuss the impact from variance and covariance between the 
share of capital flows on the global investment portfolio (investment shares in domestic 
and foreign risky investment) and the expected growth of consumption. From the 
previous section, we determined the optimal level of the investment shares on domestic 
(  
 ) and foreign risky asset (  
 ) and the expected consumption growth (  ). We explore 
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the first order conditions with respect of    ,   ,    , and provide interpretations on the 
portion of risky investments and growth
4
. 
2.3.1  The Effects of         and         
We first look at the fraction of domestic risky investments (  
 ). By differentiating 
equation (2-18) in   , we have, 
   
 
   
 
    
        
              
  
Since      ,      , and riskless return (r) is greater than zero, the 
denominator is positive. Considering the risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition (the risk-
adjusted excess returns of domestic and foreign risky assets, ([  (      )   ]   ⁄ ) and 
([  (      )   ]   ⁄ ), are equal, where    and    are the standard error of        and 
       respectively), the sign of (   
    ⁄ ) is negative (see proof in the Appendix B). 
Thus, 
   
 
   
                     (2-21) 
i.e. The higher the volatility of domestic risky returns, the lower will be the share of 
risky investment in domestic assets. 
Second, by differentiating equation (2-19) over   , we have, 
   
 
   
 
             
                   
  
                                                          
4
 The investment shares of risk-free assets (  
 ) is determined when we obtain the optimal level of the 
investment shares on domestic (  
 ) and foreign risky asset (  
 ). However, we can still consider the effects 
of   ,   ,     on   
 , and the discussion is in Appendix C. 
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Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, the sign of (   
    ⁄ ) is positive (see proof in the 
Appendix B). Thus, 
   
 
   
                 (2-22) 
i.e. the higher the volatility of domestic risky returns, the higher will be the 
proportion of risky investment in foreign assets. 
Third, by differentiating equation (2-20) in   , we have, 
   
   
 
     
                 
             
  
Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, the sign of (      ⁄ ) is negative (see proof in the 
Appendix B). Thus, 
   
   
                 (2-23) 
i.e. the higher the volatility of domestic risky returns, the lower will be the expected 
consumption growth. 
We can summarize the findings from equation (2-21) to (2-23) in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: For      ,       and,    , an increase in domestic 
volatility leads to (a) a decline in the share of domestic assets, (b) a rise in the share of 
foreign assets, and  (c) a decline in expected consumption growth. 
Following the same process, we could examine the effects of the volatility of foreign 
risky return (  ). By differentiating equation (2-18) over   , we have, 
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Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, the sign of (   
    ⁄ ) is positive (proof is in 
Appendix B). Thus, 
   
 
   
                 (2-24) 
i.e. the higher the volatility of foreign risky returns, the higher will be the proportion 
of risky investment in domestic assets. 
Similarly, by differentiating equation (2-19), we have 
   
 
   
 
    
        
                   
  
Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, the sign of (   
    ⁄ ) is negative (proof is in 
Appendix B). 
   
 
   
                 (2-25) 
i.e. the higher the volatility of foreign risky returns, the lower will be the share of 
risky investment in foreign assets. 
By differentiating the expected consumption growth (  ) in   , we have 
   
   
 
           
 
             
                 (2-26) 
i.e. the higher the volatility of foreign risky returns, the lower will be the expected 
consumption growth. 
In sum, we address the following proposition from equation (2-24) to (2-26), 
Proposition 2: For      ,       and,    , an increase in foreign 
volatility leads to (a) a rise in the share of domestic assets, (b) a decline in the share of 
foreign assets, and  (c) a decline in expected consumption growth. 
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2.3.2  The Effects of            
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to illustrate 
how the systemic risk affects the portfolio and growth. Similar with the previous section, 
we first differentiate equation (2-18) and (2-19) in the covariance term (   ). 
For the share of domestic risky investment (  
 ), 
   
 
    
 
  (        
 )        
              
  
For the share of foreign risky investment (  
 ), 
   
 
    
 
  (        
 )        
                   
  
Since      ,       and    , the denominators are positive. Under the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, (   
     ⁄ ) and (   
     ⁄ ) are both negative 
(see proof in the Appendix B). Thus, 
   
 
    
                  (2-27) 
   
 
    
                  (2-28) 
The intuition is straightforward. Higher covariance between domestic and foreign 
risky returns implies more difficult to diversify the risk of portfolio by investing in both 
domestic and foreign assets, and investors are exposed to higher systemic risk. In this 
case, individuals prefer to lower the investment share in risky assets (both domestic and 
foreign), and raise the holding of risk-free assets. 
Second, by differentiating the expected growth (  ) of consumption in covariance 
(   ), we have 
   
    
 
  [  (        
 )    (      
   )]
             
  
58 
 
 
 
Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Under the risk-
adjusted non-arbitrage condition, (       ⁄ ) is negative (see proof in the Appendix B). 
Thus, 
   
    
                    (2-29) 
The explanation is straightforward. According to the findings from equation (2-27) 
and (2-28), higher level of covariance lowers the share of risky investment, and raises the 
investment in risk-free assets. Since the return of risk-free investment is lower than risky 
investment, the consumption growth would be lower due to the lower return from the 
investment portfolio. This finding indicates that higher covariance which implies higher 
level of systemic risk reduces the benefit from the risk diversification. 
We can summarize the findings from equation (2-27) to (2-29) in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: For      ,       and,    , an increase in the covariance 
of domestic and foreign risky returns leads to (a) a decline in the share of domestic assets, 
(b) a decline in the share of foreign assets, and (c) a decline in expected consumption 
growth.  
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2.4  Numerical Analysis: An example of Taiwan 
In the section 2.2, we show that the fraction of wealth invests in domestic and foreign 
risky assets (  
 ,   
 ), and the expected consumption growth (  ) as functions of risk-free 
return, expected risky returns, volatilities of risky returns, covariance of domestic and 
foreign risky returns, and other parameters of transaction cost, capital inflow and time 
preference. In section 2.3, we show the relationship between the “risk” and “growth”. It is 
feasible for us to see how the portfolio and growth is affected by manipulating these 
parameters, especially the parameters we are interested (volatilities and correlation). In 
this section, we are going to demonstrate how the volatilities and correlation between 
risky assets affect the portfolio and growth by applying the numerical analysis. 
The numerical example is based on the stock market returns. The home country is 
Taiwan, and the foreign country is United States. The annual stock market returns are 
calculated from Taiwan stock exchange index and NASDAQ stock market index, 1984-
2012, to estimate the expected domestic and foreign risky returns, variance and 
covariance. The presumption for the usage of data is that we assume the NASDAQ stock 
index is an approximation of the price of foreign risky assets. Table 2.1 shows the list of 
parameters we assign to the numerical example, and the equilibrium results from the 
model. We assume the risk-free return (r) is 0.05,      ,     ,    . 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
Considering the effects of volatilities, Figure 2.2 and 2.3 show the patterns of shares 
in risky investments (  
  and   
 ) and expected consumption growth (  ). When the 
variance of domestic (foreign) risky assets increases, individuals will decrease (increase) 
the fraction of domestic risky investment, and increase (decrease) the holding of foreign 
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risky assets. In other words, the variances of risky returns affect the shares of domestic 
and foreign risky investments inversely. As we discussed in the previous section, the 
effect on the expected consumption growth is negative. In Figure 2.1 and 2.2, we can 
observe that, when other conditions unchanged, higher volatility of risky return will 
induce lower consumption growth. 
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
Considering the effects of covariance, Figure 2.4 shows that when the covariance 
increases, other conditions unchanged, the shares in domestic and foreign risky 
investment and the expected consumption growth will decrease. Intuitively, larger 
covariance between risky returns implies the effectiveness of risk diversification is lower. 
Moreover, larger covariance also implies a higher level of potential systemic risk
5
. With 
higher covariance, individuals will choose to hold less risky assets no matter domestic or 
foreign (  
  and   
  both decrease), and the expected consumption growth is lower due to 
the lower portfolio return. This result is consistent with the stylized fact which is a 
negative relationship between the levels of systemic risk and consumption growth (Figure 
2.1). 
[Insert Figure 2.4 here] 
In addition, we are able to examine the effect of transaction costs ( ) imposed on the 
international transaction, and might be affected by financial market (institution) 
                                                          
5
 Figure 2.4 and 2.6 shows the positive regime of covariance to demonstrate the effects of systemic risk 
which means the positive relationship between the risky returns. However, the pattern is the same in the 
negative regime of covariance. 
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perfection, search and information cost, and the degree of international capital mobility. 
According to our numerical example (Table 2.1), we evaluate the effect of transaction 
cost on shares in risky investments (  
  and   
 ) and expected consumption growth (  ) in 
Figure 2.5. The proportion on domestic investments (   
 ) has small change when 
transaction costs increases from 0 to 50% (slightly drops from 61% to 56%). However, 
the proportion on foreign investments (  
 ) decreases dramatically from 61% to 7% when 
transaction cost increases. The expected consumption growth (  ) also decreases due to 
the decreases of the shares in both domestic and foreign risky investments which have 
higher returns. This finding indicates the benefit from lower transaction cost. However, 
lower cost on international transactions implies more open financial markets. But this 
might also elevate the systemic risk (higher correlation between domestic and foreign 
returns), which might affect the economy adversely. To investigate the role of transaction 
cost ( ) in the context of the relationship between systemic risk an economic growth, we 
consider the effects of covariance on expected consumption growth under different level 
of transaction cost. In Figure 2.6, we can observe that higher covariance is associated 
with lower growth (       ⁄   are negative), and the marginal effect of covariance 
decreases with higher levels covariance. More importantly, Figure 2.6 shows that higher 
transaction cost ( ) is associated with a less negative effect of covariance on growth 
(       ⁄ ). In other words, the country with larger transaction cost (less open to 
international financial markets) would have smaller drawback from the increase of 
systemic risk. 
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In sum, we have two observations about the effect of transaction cost: (a) lower 
transaction cost implies more open financial markets, and benefits the economic growth; 
(b) higher transaction cost could mitigate the drawback from increasing systemic risk. 
Since we have two opposite directions from the effects of transaction cost on growth, for 
the further research, it will be interesting to revisit the theoretical model by considering 
the central planner, and find the “optimal” value of transaction cost. 
[Insert Figure 2.5 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.6 here] 
One step further, to examine the effectiveness of our model, we compute the expected 
consumption growth from the model, and see if the theoretical results could capture the 
variation of the actual data. In order to illustrate dynamic patterns in theoretical results, 
we use 10 years as a window period, and calculate the rolling average returns, variances 
and covariance from Taiwan stock exchange index and NASDAQ stock market index 
(sample period shrinks to 1994-2012). Note that the rolling average returns, variances and 
covariance represent the expectation for the next period. For instance, the average return 
calculated in the end of 2000 (the window period is from 1991 to 2000) represents the 
expected return in 2001. Figure 2.7 shows the trends of expected consumption growth 
(theoretical value) and the growths of consumption per capita and GDP per capita 
(GDPPC) from 1994 to 2012. Since the growths of consumption per capita and GDP per 
capita are the actual statistical data from DGBAS (The Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics) in Taiwan, the similarity of patterns between theoretical and 
actual values indicates the effectiveness of our model which is useful to capture the 
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variation of actual values
6
. Note that, to focus on the variation of data, we neglect the 
influence of starting value, and apply the values of expected consumption growth, 
consumption per capita growth and of GDP per capita growth are transformed into 
indices which set the value in 1994 as 100. 
[Insert Figure 2.7 here] 
2.5  Concluding Remarks 
Financial integration is supposed to stabilize the financial market, and creates the 
opportunity for risk diversification, and the channel of risk-sharing is considered to 
benefit the economic. However, in an opposite direction, the contagion effect of the 
financial crises in the recent decades draws the attention to the “cost” of financial 
integration. Financial integration is not only creates valuable opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, risk sharing, and intertemporal trade, but also create the potential for 
systemic risk. 
This paper focuses on the issue of risk, and constructs a stochastic dynamic model to 
demonstrate the effects of risk on growth. The main feature of the model is that each 
individual can invest in three projects, risk-free investment, domestic risky investment 
and foreign risky investment, and determine the share for each project. The model shows 
how the growth of expected consumptions affected volatilities of both risky returns, and 
the covariance between two risky returns. Incorporating the risk-adjusted non-arbitrage 
                                                          
6
 Before 2001, the theoretical value follows the actual values of growth with one year lag. However, after 
2001, the correlation coefficient between the theoretical value (expected consumption growth) and the 
actual growth of consumption per capita is 75.98%, and the correlation coefficient between the theoretical 
value and the actual growth of GDP per capita is 78.62%! 
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condition, higher volatility of domestic (foreign) risky returns lowers the investment 
share on domestic (foreign) risky asset, but raises the investment share on foreign 
(domestic) risky assets. Also, higher volatilities on both domestic and foreign returns 
lower the growth of expected consumption. We address the systemic effect to the extent 
of correlation of risk between domestic and foreign investment (Stiglitz, 2010). We are 
able to show that higher correlation between domestic and foreign risky returns lowers 
the share of investment in both risky assets, and growth. In other words, the potential cost 
from the systemic risk could lower the benefit from risk diversification in an integrated 
financial market.  
The stochastic dynamic model provides a theoretical framework to illustrate the effect 
of volatilities and systemic risk on growth. It is also feasible to apply the theoretical 
results into practice. We use the stock market data from Taiwan and US. The numerical 
example shows the consistent results with our model. Moreover, the model is able to 
capture the variation of actual data, and has the potential for the prediction of economic 
growth. In addition, we evaluate the impact of transaction cost, and find the benefit from 
lower transaction cost. However, there is a tradeoff in reducing transaction costs. While 
lower transaction costs (associated with more open financial markets) enhance economic 
growth, they also exacerbate the drawback from the increasing systemic risk which 
would have adverse economic growth.. Searching for an optimal value of transaction cost 
would be a critical topic for the further research, and it is also worth to investigate as an 
important policy issue.  
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Figures and Table 
 
Note: The correlation coefficients are computed by the risk premium (lending rate minus treasury bill rate) for each 
country against the world average. The solid line is estimated by the linear regression. 
Figure 2.1 Relationship Between Correlation Coefficient and Consumption Growth 
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Note: The left axis indicates the share of risky investment investments (   
  and   
 ).The right 
axis indicates the expected consumption growth (  ). 
Figure 2.2  The Effects of           on Portfolio and Growth 
 
Note: The left axis indicates the share of risky investment investments (   
  and   
 ).The right 
axis indicates the expected consumption growth (  ). 
Figure 2.3  The Effects of          on Portfolio and Growth 
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Note: The left axis indicates the share of risky investment investments (   
  and   
 ).The right 
axis indicates the expected consumption growth (  ). 
Figure 2.4  The Effects of the Covariance on Portfolio and Growth 
 
 
Note: The left axis indicates the share of risky investment investments (   
  and   
 ).The right 
axis indicates the expected consumption growth (  ). 
Figure 2.5  The Effects of Transaction Cost ( ) on Portfolio and Growth 
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Figure 2.6  The Effects of Transaction Cost ( ) on Growth Effect by Covariance 
 
 
 
Note: The values of expected consumption growth, consumption per capita growth and of GDP per 
capita growth are transformed into indices which set the value in 1994 as 100. 
Figure 2.7  Theoretical and Actual Value of Growth 
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Table 2.1  Stock Market Returns and Equilibrium Results 
 
Expected 
return (%) 
Variance 
(%) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
(%) 
Shares in risky 
investments 
Expected 
consumption 
growth 
Taiwan 16.36 20.50 28.61 0.5977 1.42 
United States 12.22 8.15 
 
0.5065 
 
Note: The result is based on the assumptions that        ,      ,     ,    . 
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Appendix A 
We begin by defining a function  (
    
  
       ) for eventual use in a Taylor expansion, 
such that, 
 (
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[         (      )]                      (1-A) 
The conditional expectation of  (
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 [        ]}            (2-A) 
From equation (1-A), we can apply the Taylor approximation around 
    
  
   and 
         (      ), then 
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Taking conditional expectations on both sides of equation (3-A), 
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  )  [        ]}                                     (4-A) 
Combining (2-A) and (4-A), we have, 
     {(
    
  
)
  
 [        ]}        {(
    
  
  )  [        ]}                       (5-A) 
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Appendix B 
To identify the directions of how the changes of volatilities and covariance affect the 
share of domestic and foreign risky investment (  
  and   
 ) and expected consumption 
growth (  ), we need to incorporate the risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition (the risk-
adjusted excess returns of domestic and foreign risky assets, ([  (      )   ]   ⁄ ) and 
([  (      )   ]   ⁄ ), are equal, where    and    are the standard error of        and 
       respectively). For instance, to determine the sign of (   
    ⁄ ), we have the 
following conditions, 
{
   
 
   
                
   
 
   
                
  
Dividing both side by (   ) and applying the risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, 
we have 
{
   
 
   
                                 
   
 
   
                                 
  
where      
   
    
 ,       
   and      
  
Since        , condition (1-B) is ruled out, QED. 
Considering the effects of covariance on the shares of risky investments, we take 
(   
     ⁄ ) as example. 
{
   
 
    
                           
  
   
 
    
                          
  
  
Applying the risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition and solve for    , we have, 
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Condition (3-B) is impossible and ruled out, QED. Similar analysis can be carried for 
  
  and   . 
Appendix C 
According to the constrain of the stochastic intertemporal maximization (equation 2-2) 
problem and the optimal level of the share of domestic and foreign risky investments (  
  
and   
 ) (equation 2-18 and 2-19), we can obtain the share of risk-free investment (  
 ) as 
follow, 
  
        
    
   
   
      
        
  [         ]
        
        
       [         ]
                      
By differentiating equation (1-C) in   , we have, 
   
 
   
 
   
        
              
 
            
                   
                                              
Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, equation (2-C) can be simplified as, 
   
 
   
 
     (     )[           ]
                   
                                                                 
The sign of equation (3-C) is determined by    and    , where 
{
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From proposition 1, we know that an increase in domestic volatility leads to a decline 
in the share of domestic assets (  
 ) and a rise in the share of foreign assets (  
 ). 
However, it is not necessary a perfect substitution from one risky asset to another 
(except            ⁄ ). From equation (4-C) and (5-C), if the foreign risky 
investment is high enough, the individual will increase the investment in risk-free assets 
when domestic volatility rises. 
Similarly, by differentiating equation (1-C) in   , we have, 
   
 
   
 
            
              
  
   
        
                   
                                              
Since      ,       and    , the denominator is positive. Considering the 
risk-adjusted non-arbitrage condition, equation (6-C) can be simplified as, 
   
 
   
 
     (     )[           ]
                   
                                                                   
The sign of equation (7-C) is determined by    and    , where 
{
   
 
   
                                             
   
 
   
                                             
  
Again, it is not necessary a perfect substitution from domestic assets to foreign assets 
when foreign volatility is higher (except            ). If the domestic risky 
investment is high enough, the individual will increase the investment in risk-free assets 
when foreign volatility rises. 
Finally, the effect of            on   
  is obvious. From proposition 3, we know an 
increase in the covariance of domestic and foreign risky returns leads to a decline in the 
share of risky assets. In other words, the share of risk-free assets (  
 ) will rise. 
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Chapter 3 
Financial Integration and Economic Volatility 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s, the level of international capital mobility has increased 
significantly, and a large literature has concentrated on investigating the economic 
consequences of financial integration. However, the main stream of the literature focuses 
on the impact of financial integration on economic growth, and the studies of economic 
volatility are relatively few. 
Considering the relationship between international financial integration and economic 
volatility, one of the key channels is risk diversification (Prasad et. al., 2003). Intuitively, 
more financially integrated economies should experience less macroeconomic volatility 
because of the lower overall risk that arises from risk diversification. However, from the 
existing literatures, it is difficult to reaching any definitive conclusion on an inverse 
relationship between financial integration and macroeconomic volatility. 
Razin and Rose (1994) use cross-sectional analysis to examine the effect of current 
and capital account openness on the volatility of output, consumption, and investment for 
a sample of 138 countries over 1950-1988. They conclude that there is no significant 
correlation between openness and volatility. Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2002) discuss 
the impact of international financial integration on business cycle volatility by using 25 
OECD countries over the period 1969-1999. Based on the panel analysis, they find no 
consistent link between openness and output volatility for the sample period. 
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On the other hand, several other studies show that higher degree of openness is 
associated with higher degree of volatility. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) study the 
determinants of growth volatility based on 74 countries over 1960-1997. They find the 
countries with well-developed domestic financial sector are associated with lower 
volatility, and also that openness exposes a country to greater volatility of growth. Gavin 
and Hausmann (1996) study the sources of macroeconomic volatility in developing 
countries, and find a significant positive association between the volatility of capital 
flows and output volatility. O’Donnell (2001) examines the effect of financial integration 
on the volatility of output growth using data for 93 countries over 1971-1994, finding that 
higher financial integration is associated with higher output volatility in non-OECD 
countries
1
. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) study the linkage between openness and 
volatility based on 76 countries over the period 1960-1999. They find that financial 
openness is associated with higher volatilities of consumption and income. They also find 
that this relationship is nonlinear. Once the level of financial openness crosses a 
particular threshold, openness leads to lower volatility. 
Several researches indicate that greater financial openness is associated to lower 
volatility of either output or consumption. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) examine 
the impacts of equity market liberalization and capital account openness on the volatility 
of consumption growth for 95 countries during 1980-2000. They find that financial 
liberalization is mostly associated with lower consumption growth volatility. Prasad et. al. 
(2007) investigates the impact of financial integration on growth volatility for 76 
                                                          
1
 O’Donnell (2001) examines 93 countries from 1971 to 1994 and finds that a higher degree of financial 
integration is associated to lower (higher) output volatility in OECD (non-OECD) countries. 
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developing countries. They find that developing countries can rely on financial 
integration to stabilize fluctuation of consumption growth. However, the critical part of 
the benefit from financial integration is determined by the development of financial 
institution and the quality of governance. IMF (2002) provides evidence to indicate 
financial integration to be associated with lower output volatility in the developing 
countries. 
Given this mixed evidence the effect of international financial integration on 
economic volatility remains unclear and may well be influenced by the economic 
environment (economic development, financial institution and governance)
2
. One study 
by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009), investigates the possibility that directions of capital 
flows (capital flows in assets or liabilities) and different types of capital flows (i.e., equity 
versus debt) may be conductive to risk sharing. Measuring risk sharing as the gap 
between domestic and world economic growth, and studying the effect of capital flows 
on risk sharing, they find only a modest degree of capital flows on international risk 
sharing. In this paper we utilize a similar breakdown of capital flows into different 
directions and different types, to ask a different question; namely the effect of capital 
flows on economic volatility. This question has not been previously asked in the literature. 
Yet its importance can be surmised by the raging debate on the role of international 
finance on propagation of systemic risk.  
We focus on the channels by which financial integration impacts economic volatility, 
in terms of both the directions and the types of capital flows. To elaborate we argue that 
                                                          
2
 See also Wang and Wen (2013). Based on data from 106 countries (1986-2006), they find a negative 
relationship between financial development and aggregate volatility. 
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the risk-sharing benefit from financial integration is more likely associated with capital 
outflow than inflow. Capital outflows are driven by domestic capital holders who invest 
in foreign assets, and diversify the idiosyncratic risk from their home country. In other 
words, capital outflow (accumulation of external assets) might be associated with lower 
economic volatility. By contrast, capital inflow (accumulation of external liabilities) 
would be expected to affect economic volatility differently. The recipient (home) country 
experiencing capital inflow augments its own specific risk (idiosyncratic risk), with the 
added exposure the risk from host countries who are holders (owners) of home country’s 
assets. If so, then capital inflow is likely to be associated with higher economic volatility. 
In this paper we examine this (dual) hypothesis. 
In previous studies, the quantitative measure of international financial integration is 
based on combining capital outflow and inflow (either by summation or net value). This 
approach is unable to explain the potential distinct impact on economic volatility, coming 
from different directions of capital flows. In this paper, we address this shortcoming. We 
re-examine the effect of financial integration on economic volatility based on 116 
countries over the period 1975-2010, and break down the de facto indicator of financial 
integration into capital outflow and inflow to explore the notion that different directions 
of capital flow have potentially different effects on volatility. We also examine the effects 
of different types of capital flows (equity and debt) on economic volatility. Results from 
the analysis of panel data suggest that external assets (capital outflow) have significantly 
negative effect on consumption growth volatility, while external liabilities (capital inflow) 
have significantly positive effect. However, these effects are insignificant for the output 
growth volatility. A closer look of different types of capital flows reveals that the effects 
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arise mainly from the external debt assets and liabilities, rather than equity assets and 
liabilities. Furthermore, considering the different levels of economic and financial 
development (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2001; O’Donnell, 2001; Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones, 2003; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2006; Prasad et. al., 2007; Wang and 
Wen, 2013), we separate the sample into OECD and Non-OECD countries, and find the 
effects of external assets and liabilities are insignificant for OECD countries, and 
significant for non-OECD countries. 
In this paper, we answer the linkage between financial integration and economic 
volatility, and provide a potential interpretation for the differed conclusions from 
previous studies. Moreover, instead of investigating the story of financial integration as a 
whole, the study of the impacts from the directions of capital flow on economic volatility 
offers insights and contains important implications for policy. 
Section 3.2 describes the empirical model and data. Section 3.3 shows the results of 
the panel data analysis. Section 3.4 provides concluding remarks. 
3.2  Empirical Model 
Following the empirical model by Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) on the 
relationship between international financial integration and economic volatility, we 
consider the fixed effect panel regression model for 116 countries from 1975 to 2010. 
                                                  (3-1) 
                                    
where   and   identify the country and time period respectively,    denotes the unobserved 
country effect, and    denotes the time effect.  
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The model contains three different sets of variables: (1) the set of dependent variables 
(   ); (2) the set of financial integration variables (    ); (3) the set of control variables 
(   )
3
.  The dependent variables (   ) are the 5-year standard deviation of real GDP per 
capita growth (     ), and 5-year standard deviation real consumption per capita growth 
(      )
4
. The empirical regressions are estimated separately based on different 
dependent variables. The dependent variables are measured by 5-year windows for each 
country. For instance, the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth in 2000 is 
calculated by the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth from 1996 to 2000. 
The 5-year window is used to filter out year-to-year cyclical fluctuations. In our case, the 
sample periods are counted as every 5 years from 1975 to 2010, and each country has 8 
periods. 
    ’s are the dependent variables associated with financial integration. Here, we 
considered both de jure and de facto indices. For the de jure index, we incorporate the 
KAOPEN index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008). KAOPEN is based on variables 
that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). The index is the first standardized principal component of four categories of 
restrictions on external accounts.  
For de facto indices, we introduce two measures of international financial integration, 
originally constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). These measures estimate the 
                                                          
3
 The data source is listed in appendix. 
4
 To deal with the outlier issue in economic volatility, we eliminate the observations which are larger than 
the twice of standard deviation. 
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stock of external assets and liabilities of countries derived from the flow data on external 
assets and liabilities (also known as international investment Position, IIP) that are 
computed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
construct two measures of financial integration, IFIGDP and GEQY. The IFIGDP 
measure includes all five categories available in the IMF’s IIP: portfolio investments, 
foreign direct investments (FDI), other investments, financial derivatives and reserve 
assets, all as a share of GDP; GEQY contains only the equity components of IIP, the 
portfolio investment in equity, and FDI. Moreover, as we discussed in the introduction, to 
examine the different impacts on economic volatility from capital inflow and outflow, we 
break down the IIP into two sectors, total external assets and total external liabilities. 
These variables are addressed as shares of GDP (TA/GDP and TL/GDP). For different 
types of capital flows, we consider the capital flows in equity (the portfolio investment in 
equity and FDI) and debt. External assets in equity (TEqA) indicate the accumulation of 
capital outflow into foreign equity, and external liabilities in equity (TEqL) are the 
accumulation of capital inflow to domestic equity. These variables are also addressed as 
shares of GDP (TEqA/GDP and TEqL/GDP). External assets in debt (TDeA) are the 
accumulation of capital outflow into foreign debt, and external liabilities in debt (TDeL) 
are the accumulation of capital inflow to domestic debt. These variables are also 
addressed as shares of GDP (TDeA/GDP and TDeL/GDP). For each 5-year window, both 
de jure and de facto indices are computed in average. For instance, the IFIGDP in 2000 is 
calculated as the average IFIGDP from 1996 to 2000. 
   ’s are the control variables which include years of schooling (YoS, a proxy for 
human capital), natural log of population (lnPOP) and real GDP per capita (lnRGDP), 
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trade openness (sum of exports and imports divided by GDP), and terms of trade (ToT, 
price of exportable goods divided by price of importable goods). All these control 
variables are computed in 5-year average, and match the variables of financial integration 
(    ). 
Considering the dynamic property of economic volatility, we also examine the 
dynamic panel regression. 
                                                      (3-2) 
There are two potential endogeneity issues in this model. First, the lagged dependent 
variable (     ) as a control variable is correlated with the unobserved country fixed 
effect (  ). To deal with this problem, we use the GMM estimation proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). Second, other independent variables (    ,    ) may be correlated with 
the error term (    ). We use sequences of lagged values of      ,      and     as 
instruments in our estimations. 
3.3. Empirical Results 
3.3.1 Baseline Estimations 
The fixed effect model results show in Table 3.1. We regress the standard deviations 
real GDP growth (Model I, II, III and IV), and consumption growth (Model V, VI, VII 
and VIII) on the measures of financial integration and control variables described in the 
previous section. Generally, most of the control variables are insignificant in their effect 
on standard deviations of real GDP and consumption growth (      and      ). Two 
exceptions that are the natural log of population (lnPOP) and the term of trade (ToT). 
Natural log of population has negative effect on the volatilities of both GDP and 
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consumption growth. The terms of trade (ToT) which indicates the amount of import 
goods that can be purchased by a given level of export goods is considered as a benefit to 
a country. In our fixed effect estimations, terms of trade has significantly negative effect 
on the volatility of consumption growth
5
.  
Considering the impact of financial integration, we first observe that the effect of de 
jure measure of integration (KAOPEN) is insignificantly negative for the standard 
deviations of GDP growth (    ) and consumption growth (     ). This result implies 
that relaxing the restrictions of financial integration barriers has no effect on stabilizing 
the economy. 
Before we turn into decomposition of capital flows into inflow and outflows, let us 
first examine the overall effect. For the effects of de facto measures of financial 
integration (IFIGDP and GEQY), we find that IFIGDP have insignificant effects on the 
volatility of GDP and consumption growth which is consistent with the previous studies 
by Razin and Rose (1994) and Buch, Dopke, and Pierdzioch (2002). Considering the 
capital flow in equity (GEQY), we find that higher degree of financial integration in 
equity brings higher volatility in output growth. This finding is consistent with the studies 
of Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001), Gavin and Hausmann (1996) and Kose, Prasad, 
and Terrones (2003), and implies that capital flow in equity investment (portfolio 
investments and FDI) is crucial to the volatility in output. However, the capital flows in 
equity have no effect on consumption growth volatility. 
                                                          
5
 The significance disappears in our dynamic panel estimations in Table 3.2. 
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By decomposing the de facto measure of financial integration, we separate the 
international investment position into external assets and external liabilities as shares of 
GDP. The GDP share of external assets indicates the stock value of capital outflow 
(TA/GDP). The GDP share of external liabilities indicates the stock value of capital 
inflow (TL/GDP). From Table 3.1, we find that higher external assets is associated with 
significantly lower consumption growth volatility (lower       ), and the higher external 
liabilities is significantly associated with higher consumption growth volatility. The 
empirical results are consistent with our intuition described in section 3.1. The finding 
implies the risk-diversification which is one of the key benefits from international 
financial integration is determined by the external assets (capital outflow). Higher level of 
external assets leads to lower consumption growth volatility. However, this effect is 
insignificant for the output growth volatility. One explanation may be the wealth effect. 
Since the consumption is related to consumer wealth, consumer with more wealth the 
fluctuation of consumption may be more stable. As a result, the volatility of consumption 
would be lower for the countries which hold more external assets. In contrast, the level of 
external liabilities (capital inflow) has opposite effect on consumption growth volatility. 
Due to the country with more external liabilities exposes to the risk from the other 
countries, higher level of external liabilities leads to higher economic volatility. However, 
the significances disappear in terms of output growth volatility. This result can be 
explained that the benefit of risk-diversification and the drawback of exposing to the risk 
from abroad are more associated with wealth instead of output level. 
Considering different types of capital flows, generally, external assets and liabilities 
of equity have no effect on economic volatility. One exception is the effect of external 
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assets of equity (TEqA/GDP) which has positive effect on GDP growth volatility
6
. For 
effects of external assets and liabilities of debt (TDeA/GDP and TDeL/GDP), we find the 
same directions TA/GDP and TL/GDP. Clearly, the major effects on economic volatility 
are from the capital flows in debts. The country that holds more external debts from other 
countries is associated with lower economic volatility. The country that has more external 
debts (the debt is owed to creditors outside the country) is associated with higher 
economic volatility. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
To incorporate the dynamic property of economic volatility, we apply the dynamic 
panel analysis, and re-estimate the models. Results, presented in Table 3.2 are similar to 
those in Table 3.1 with the exception that the terms of trade (ToT) term becomes 
insignificant. The effect of KAOPEN is still insignificant. Higher IFIGDP and GEQY 
bring higher volatility in growth. Of course, the main interest of this paper is the study of 
external assets (capital outflow) and external liabilities (capital inflow). Our results are 
consistent with those from the fixed effects approach discussed previously. The benefit of 
risk-diversification as manifested by the external assets (capital outflow), are associated 
with less economic volatility. On the other hand, higher levels of external liabilities 
(capital inflow) imply that the country is exposed to the additional risk from countries 
that are the holders (owners) of home country’s assets, and raises economic volatility. 
Similarly, these effects are more significant in consumption growth volatility. 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
                                                          
6
 However, the effect of external assets in equity (TEqA/GDP) becomes insignificant in dynamic panel 
estimations (Table 3.2). 
87 
 
 
 
3.3.2 OECD vs. Non-OECD Estimations 
From the previous studies, the effect of international financial integration on 
economic volatility is influenced by the economic environment (Easterly, Islam and 
Stiglitz, 2001; O’Donnell, 2001; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003; Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad, 2006; Prasad et. al., 2007; Wang and Wen, 2013). In this paper, we separate 
the whole sample countries into two groups, OECD and Non-OECD countries, and see if 
the international financial integration brings different effects. 
Table 3.3a and 3.3b shows the result based on fixed effect model. Most of the control 
variables are insignificant except the natural log of population (lnPOP) and the trems of 
trade (ToT) in Non-OECD countries for consumption growth volatility (      ). 
Especially for the terms of trade, the finding indicates that the benefit of ToT is crucial 
for the Non-OECD countries for stabilizing the consumption growth volatility. 
The de jure measure of financial integration, KAOPEN, is significantly negative in 
both output and consumption growth volatility for OECD countries, but is insignificant 
for Non-OECD countries. This result is consistent with the studies by O’Donnell, (2001). 
International financial market deregulation is associated with lower economic volatility in 
the OECD countries, but does not affect the volatility in Non-OECD countries. However, 
considering the de facto measure of financial integration, the coefficients of IFIGDP and 
GEQY are positive and significant for OECD countries indicating the financial 
integration raises the economic volatility.  
The main interest of this paper is to examine the distinct effects of external assets 
(capital outflow) and liabilities (capital inflow) on volatility. Once we separate the 
sample into OECD and Non-OECD groups, we find the coefficients of TA/GDP (external 
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assets divided by GDP) and TL/GDP (external liabilities divided by GDP) are 
insignificant for both OECD and Non-OECD countries in terms of GDP growth volatility, 
but significant in both OECD and Non-OECD countries in terms of consumption growth 
volatility with signs consistent with our expectation. This result is consistent with the 
outcomes in Table 3.1, and indicates that the benefit of risk-diversification from financial 
integration is significant for consumption growth volatility. 
Considering different types of capital flows, Table 3.3a Model IV shows that the 
external equity assets and liabilities (TEqA/GDP and TEqL/GDP) yield results that are 
contrary to our expectation. Higher accumulation of capital outflow to foreign equity is 
associated with higher output volatility, and higher accumulation of capital inflow to 
domestic equity is associated with lower output volatility. This result implies that as far 
as equity capital is concerned, the benefits of risk-diversification for OECD countries 
may not carry through its outflow, nor do the drawbacks (from the added exposure to risk) 
carry through its inflow
7
. Considering the effects on consumption volatility in Model VIII, 
External equity assets and liabilities have no effects on consumption volatility, and 
external debt liabilities (TDeL/GDP) are significantly positive to consumption volatility. 
In other words, for OECD countries, holding more external assets in both equity and debt 
may not be able to lower the economic volatility, and borrowing capital from abroad by 
issuing debt (external debt liabilities) will raise the volatility of consumption growth. For 
Non-OECD countries, the effects of KAOPEN, IFIGDP and GEQY are insignificant. 
However, the directions of capital flows have significant effects on consumption 
                                                          
7
 This result contrary to our expectation is insignificant in the dynamic panel estimations in Table 3.4a. 
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volatility, confirming our expectation: higher TA/GDP is related to lower volatility; 
higher TL/GDP is related to higher volatility. This result indicates the effects of capital 
flows are crucial to consumption growth instead of output growth for Non-OECD 
countries. Checking the different types of capital flows, we find the source of the effects 
of capital flows is mainly from the external debt. Moreover, higher external debt asset 
(TDeA/GDP) is related to lower volatility in both output and consumption growth, higher 
external debt liabilities (TDeL/GDP) is related to higher volatility. This result indicates 
that holding more external debt assets is associated with more stable economy, and more 
external debt liabilities held by the foreign is associated with higher economic volatility 
for Non-OECD countries. 
[Insert Table 3.3a here] 
[Insert Table 3.3b here] 
Also, we examine the effects of financial integration on volatility under the dynamic 
panel framework (Table 3.4a and 3.4b). Unsurprisingly, the results are quite similar. In 
general, the effects from de jure measure of financial integration (KAOPEN) are 
insignificant for both OECD and Non-OECD countries. For the de facto measure of 
integration (IFIGDP and GEQY), we find higher degree of financial integration is related 
to higher economic volatility in OECD countries, and this effects are insignificant for 
Non-OECD countries. The results for external assets and liabilities are similar with fixed 
effect estimations. Both TA/GDP and TL/GDP are insignificant for OECD countries in 
terms of output and consumption volatilities, but significant on consumption volatility for 
Non-OECD countries with signs matched our expectation. Considering different types of 
capital flows, the economic volatility is not affected by the external assets and liabilities 
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in equity and external assets in debt for OECD countries. However, the significantly 
positive effect of the external debt liabilities on consumption growth volatility shows that 
higher external debt liabilities will increase the volatility of consumption growth. In the 
case of Non-OECD group, we find the consumption growth volatility is still significantly 
affected by the external debt (accumulation of capital flows in debt). Higher external debt 
asset is associated with lower consumption volatility, higher external debt liabilities is 
related to higher consumption volatility. 
[Insert Table 3.4a here] 
[Insert Table 3.4b here] 
3.4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we unveil a critical part in the discussion of the channel between 
financial integration and economic volatility, directions of capital flow. The effect on 
economic volatility depends on level of external assets (capital outflow) and external 
liabilities (capital inflow). Intuitively, the risk-sharing benefit is determined by capital 
outflow, and lowers the economic volatility. On the other hand, a country exposes to the 
risk from abroad through the capital inflow, and higher level of external liabilities is 
associated with higher economic volatility. 
We re-examine the effect of financial integration on economic volatility based on 116 
countries over the period 1975-2010. The empirical results indicate that relaxing the 
restrictions of financial integration barriers might lower GDP and consumption growth 
volatility of growth. However, the effects are not significant. Considering the effects of 
de facto measures of financial integration, we find that countries with higher external 
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positions are associated with higher economic volatility, especially for the OECD 
countries. 
Considering the directions of capital flows, we find that financial integration driven 
by capital outflow (higher external assets) benefits the consumption smoothing (lower 
consumption growth volatility). Higher level of external liabilities is associated with 
higher consumption growth volatility, and implies the country is exposed to the risk from 
abroad. Examining different types of capital flows, we are able to identify the sources of 
the effects on external assets and liabilities. The critical part of external positions that 
affect the consumption growth volatility is external debt. The country which holds more 
external debt assets from other countries is associated with lower economic volatility. 
The country that has more external debt liabilities (the debt is owed to creditors outside 
the country) is associated with higher economic volatility. 
Considering the effects of international financial integration in OECD and Non-
OECD countries, we find the benefit of risk-diversification from external assets is not 
significant for OECD countries, but is crucial for Non-OECD countries. On the other 
hand, external liabilities have no effect for OECD countries, but have significantly 
positive effect on volatility in Non-OECD countries. Similar result can be found in the 
external debt assets and liabilities for Non-OECD countries, and indicates the effects of 
different directions in capital flows are mainly determined by the external debt.  
This paper answers the relationship between financial integration and economic 
volatility, and provides an interpretation of how the directions of capital flows (external 
assets and liability) affect economic volatility. Moreover, by examine different types of 
capital flows, the benefit of risk-diversification which lower the economic volatility is 
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mainly from the external debt assets (accumulation of capital outflow in debt), and the 
additional risk from financial integration which raises the economic volatility is mainly 
induced by the external debt liabilities (accumulation of capital inflow in debt). The 
findings contain insightful policy implications, and have the potential for further 
investigation. 
Several questions remain for further research. First, can capital flows in debt be 
thought of as “ex-post” and capital flows in equity as “ex-ante”? If so, could such an ex-
ante/ex-post distinction explain the differences in the effects on consumption versus 
output growth volatilities? The idea here would be the potential difference between the 
ex-ante and ex-post instruments in their role in consumption smoothing. In the same vein, 
could the greater sensitivity of consumption growth volatility to change in external assets 
and liabilities stem from ex-ante risk-sharing over output and the ex-post response over 
consumption? Second, instead of using standard deviation to measure the economic 
volatility, should one consider other volatility indices (e.g. VIX) to capture the property 
of economic volatility as short-term shocks? Third, since the effects of capital flows are 
determined by external debt (assets and liabilities), should one consider the potential 
difference in the impact of public versus private debt? These are among questions that we 
will consider in further pursuit of the present line of inquiry.  
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Tables 
Table 3.1  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (Fixed effect model) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
lnPOP 
-2.2546 
(0.9041)** 
-2.3983 
(0.8911)*** 
-2.1910 
(0.8918)** 
-1.8303 
(0.9105)** 
-2.9044 
(1.0660)*** 
-2.8853 
(1.0542)*** 
-2.5688 
(1.0462)** 
-2.1754 
(1.0638)** 
lnRGDP 
-0.5431 
(0.4761) 
-0.4638 
(0.4891) 
-0.4195 
(0.5032) 
-0.3081 
(0.4968) 
-1.4292 
(0.7910)* 
-1.5002 
(0.7997)* 
-0.9023 
(0.8337) 
-0.7031 
(0.8653) 
YoS 
-0.0371 
(0.1789) 
-0.0432 
(0.1767) 
-0.0237 
(0.1763) 
-0.0265 
(0.1714) 
-0.0880 
(0.1969) 
-0.0953 
(0.2007) 
-0.0113 
(0.1851) 
-0.0531 
(0.1729) 
Openness 
0.0079 
(0.0047) 
0.0058 
(0.0051) 
0.0088 
(0.0050)* 
0.0063 
(0.0052) 
0.0098 
(0.0057)* 
0.0096 
(0.0065) 
0.0141 
(0.0060)** 
0.0179 
(0.0057)*** 
ToT 
0.0053 
(0.0034) 
0.0050 
(0.0034) 
0.0054 
(0.0034) 
0.0046 
(0.0032) 
-0.0075 
(0.0030)** 
-0.0079 
(0.0030)** 
-0.0073 
(0.0031)** 
-0.0083 
(0.0029)*** 
KAOPEN 
-0.1582 
(0.0933)* 
-0.1746 
(0.1010)* 
-0.1492 
(0.0903) 
-0.0716 
(0.0903) 
-0.1220 
(0.1400) 
-0.1197 
(0.1457) 
-0.1026 
(0.1417) 
-0.0683 
(0.1408) 
IFIGDP 
0.0642 
(0.0860)    
0.0058 
(0.1009)    
GEQY 
 
0.2174 
(0.1240)*    
0.1439 
(0.2308)   
TA/GDP 
  
-0.1576 
(0.2748)    
-0.8106 
(0.2747)***  
TL/GDP 
  
0.2510 
(0.1968)    
0.7025 
(0.2027)***  
TEqA/GDP 
   
1.0541 
(0.4997)**    
0.0005 
(0.5468) 
TEqL/GDP 
   
-0.3749 
(0.3827)    
0.1566 
(0.4805) 
TDeA/GDP 
   
-0.5674 
(0.2911)*    
-1.2140 
(0.3710)** 
TDeL/GDP 
   
0.4955 
(0.1534)***    
1.1250 
(0.3259)*** 
Constant 
28.3702 
(11.4407)** 
29.2341 
(11.3940)** 
26.4692 
(11.2518)** 
22.4695 
(11.3170)** 
44.0829 
(14.2459)*** 
44.4683 
(14.0917)*** 
35.2093 
(14.3859)** 
29.8452 
(14.8291)*** 
R
2 
(within) 0.1589 0.1616 0.1606 0.1767 0.1021 0.1131 0.1180 0.1387 
Obs. 828 812 828 802 836 820 836 806 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 3.2  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (Dynamic panel data model) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
            
0.2271 
(0.0466)*** 
0.2198 
(0.0419)*** 
0.2198 
(0.0491)*** 
0.2252 
(0.0449)***     
                
0.3264 
(0.0525)*** 
0.3247 
(0.0534)*** 
0.3063 
(0.0537)*** 
0.2991 
(0.0555)*** 
lnPOP 
-0.2221 
(0.0586)*** 
-0.2548 
(0.0605)*** 
-0.1874 
(0.0589)*** 
-0.1973 
(0.0622)*** 
-0.3333 
(0.0784)*** 
-0.3526 
(0.0760)*** 
-0.2307 
(0.0760)*** 
-0.2225 
(0.0812)*** 
lnRGDP 
-0.0795 
(0.1654) 
-0.1475 
(0.1723) 
-0.0452 
(0.1692) 
-0.0665 
(0.1810) 
-0.6691 
(0.2493)*** 
-0.6106 
(0.2499)** 
-0.4541 
(0.2610)* 
-0.4749 
(0.2804)* 
YoS 
-0.0865 
(0.0729) 
-0.0703 
(0.0707) 
-0.0828 
(0.0682) 
-0.0871 
(0.0734) 
-0.0057 
(0.1007) 
-0.0108 
(0.0987) 
-0.0351 
(0.1113) 
-0.0196 
(0.1142) 
Openness 
0.0011 
(0.0250) 
0.0001 
(0.0028) 
0.0030 
(0.0024) 
0.0027 
(0.0029) 
-0.0016 
(0.0028) 
-0.0001 
(0.0032) 
0.0022 
(0.0027) 
0.0047 
(0.0029) 
ToT 
0.0096 
(0.0062) 
0.0088 
(0.0063) 
0.0104 
(0.0065) 
0.0122 
(0.0063)* 
-0.0019 
(0.0036) 
-0.0013 
(0.0037) 
0.0004 
(0.0035) 
0.0009 
(0.0035) 
KAOPEN 
-0.1195 
(0.0752) 
-0.0938 
(0.0774) 
-0.1067 
(0.0789) 
-0.0837 
(0.0752) 
-0.1196 
(0.1021) 
-0.1209 
(0.0928) 
-0.1408 
(0.1094) 
-0.1482 
(0.1033) 
IFIGDP 
0.0654 
(0.0306)**    
0.1212 
(0.0453)***    
GEQY 
 
0.2580 
(0.1079)**    
0.1315 
(0.1380)   
TA/GDP 
  
-0.2479 
(0.1929)    
-0.7816 
(0.2033)***  
TL/GDP 
  
0.3762 
(0.1994)*    
1.0288 
(0.2373)***  
TEqA/GDP 
   
-0.0614 
(0.4110)    
-0.6134 
(0.6161) 
TEqL/GDP 
   
0.5561 
(0.4475)    
0.5961 
(0.5718) 
TDeA/GDP 
   
-0.3861 
(0.2036)*    
-0.8390 
(0.2715)*** 
TDeL/GDP 
   
0.4166 
(0.2140)*    
1.1229 
(0.3049)*** 
Constant 
4.6940 
(1.3786)*** 
5.6052 
(1.5484)*** 
3.7326 
(1.7714)** 
3.7383 
(1.7698)** 
11.5072 
(1.8894)*** 
11.1753 
(1.9921*** 
8.1274 
(1.9487)*** 
7.9255 
(2.1783)*** 
Obs. 607 597 607 588 619 609 619 600 
AR(2) test p-value 0.376 0.415 0.333 0.600 0.249 0.253 0.320 0.250 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 3.3a  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (OECD countries) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
lnPOP 
-0.5831 
(1.7446) 
-1.1709 
(2.0419) 
-0.5714 
(1.7536) 
0.1120 
(2.3561) 
-2.1485 
(2.1149) 
-3.1291 
(1.8996) 
-2.3769 
(2.1101) 
-3.0619 
(2.1320) 
lnRGDP 
-0.7820 
(0.8139) 
-0.6538 
(0.8230) 
-0.8070 
(0.8469) 
-0.3293 
(0.7969) 
0.8083 
(1.6145) 
1.0371 
(1.5662) 
1.2992 
(1.5176) 
1.5814 
(1.5700) 
YoS 
0.2154 
(0.1375) 
0.1992 
(0.1413) 
0.2163 
(0.1375) 
0.1582 
(0.1337) 
0.1475 
(0.1964) 
0.1091 
(0.1746) 
0.1284 
(0.1886) 
0.0746 
(0.1687) 
Openness 
-0.0046 
(0.0087) 
-0.0085 
(0.0105) 
-0.0047 
(0.0086) 
0.0028 
(0.0120) 
-0.0126 
(0.0104) 
-0.0180 
(0.0107) 
-0.0107 
(0.0100) 
-0.0131 
(0.0121) 
ToT 
0.0047 
(0.0114) 
0.0027 
(0.0102) 
0.0047 
(0.0114) 
0.0008 
(0.0108) 
0.0177 
(0.0113) 
0.0141 
(0.0105) 
0.0178 
(0.0112) 
0.0144 
(0.0116) 
KAOPEN 
-0.4371 
(0.1322)*** 
-0.3980 
(0.1234)*** 
-0.4370 
(0.1327)*** 
-0.3328 
(0.1302)** 
-0.3746 
(0.1589)** 
-0.3039 
(0.1433)** 
-0.3756 
(0.1563)** 
-0.2895 
(0.1430)* 
IFIGDP 
0.1131 
(0.0421)**    
0.1518 
(0.0468)***    
GEQY 
 
0.3178 
(0.1556)*    
0.4084 
(0.1824)**   
TA/GDP 
  
0.1494 
(0.1738)    
-0.5592 
(0.2846)*  
TL/GDP 
  
0.0804 
(0.1571)    
0.7920 
(0.2872)**  
TEqA/GDP 
   
1.3452 
(0.7043)*    
-0.4084 
(0.8404) 
TEqL/GDP 
   
-1.2739 
(0.6925)*    
0.6855 
(0.7699) 
TDeA/GDP 
   
0.3875 
(0.3310)    
-0.5718 
(0.3376) 
TDeL/GDP 
   
0.0944 
(0.2197)    
0.8083 
(0.2856)*** 
Constant 
15.1761 
(19.0127) 
20.2714 
(20.9208) 
15.3191 
(19.0991) 
3.7112 
(25.0592) 
12.5726 
(26.8561) 
20.9534 
(26.3975) 
9.7757 
(24.9566) 
14.4875 
(29.3716) 
R
2 
(within) 0.3141 0.3138 0.3142 0.3304 0.2503 0.2586 0.2672 0.2865 
Obs. 212 211 212 211 212 211 212 211 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 3.3b  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (Non-OECD countries) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
lnPOP 
-2.1913 
(1.4179) 
-2.4404 
(1.4944) 
-2.0789 
(1.4030) 
-2.3405 
(1.4464) 
-3.4995 
(1.7205)** 
-3.3677 
(1.7587)* 
-2.8826 
(1.7137)* 
-3.1595 
(1.7863)* 
lnRGDP 
-0.4649 
(0.5306) 
-0.3546 
(0.5568) 
-0.3571 
(0.5656) 
-0.3400 
(0.5714) 
-1.7104 
(0.8647)* 
-1.7795 
(0.8662)** 
-1.2196 
(0.9019) 
-1.0512 
(0.9337) 
YoS 
-0.1832 
(0.2638) 
-0.1902 
(0.2651) 
-0.1587 
(0.2624) 
-0.1368 
(0.2687) 
-0.1954 
(0.2897) 
-0.2043 
(0.2975) 
-0.0605 
(0.2807) 
-0.0765 
(0.2696) 
Openness 
0.0092 
(0.0052)* 
0.0068 
(0.0057) 
0.0102 
(0.0053)** 
0.0077 
(0.0057) 
0.0118 
(0.0062)* 
0.0119 
(0.0075) 
0.0166 
(0.0065)** 
0.0208 
(0.0066)*** 
ToT 
0.0052 
(0.0035) 
0.0049 
(0.0036) 
0.0052 
(0.0035) 
0.0048 
(0.0035) 
-0.0081 
(0.0030)*** 
-0.0086 
(0.0030)*** 
-0.0081 
(0.0031)** 
-0.0086 
(0.0030)*** 
KAOPEN 
-0.0511 
(0.1118) 
-0.0786 
(0.1217) 
-0.0425 
(0.1080) 
0.0317 
(0.1063) 
-0.0432 
(0.1722) 
-0.0540 
(0.1778) 
-0.0284 
(0.1758) 
0.0094 
(0.1683) 
IFIGDP 
0.0292 
(0.1247)    
-0.0557 
(0.1208)    
GEQY 
 
0.1956 
(0.1732)    
0.0879 
(0.3367)   
TA/GDP 
  
-0.1819 
(0.3309)    
-0.8761 
(0.2802)***  
TL/GDP 
  
0.1988 
(0.2260)    
0.6192 
(0.2346)***  
TEqA/GDP 
   
1.0072 
(0.6610)    
0.5478 
(0.8171) 
TEqL/GDP 
   
-0.4577 
(0.4542)    
-0.5618 
(0.7207) 
TDeA/GDP 
   
-0.6871 
(0.3189)**    
-1.6846 
(0.5105)*** 
TDeL/GDP 
   
0.5100 
(0.1978)**    
1.4885 
(0.5090)*** 
Constant 
27.3823 
(16.3078) 
28.9466 
(16.9559)* 
25.1632 
(16.2623) 
27.7945 
(16.4957)* 
51.8372 
(19.9669)** 
51.0359 
(20.2966)** 
40.6012 
(20.0813)** 
41.8784 
(20.7355)** 
R
2 
(within) 0.1653 0.1674 0.1668 0.1820 0.1085 0.1165 0.1230 0.1492 
Obs. 616 601 616 591 624 609 624 595 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 3.4a  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (OECD countries, Dynamic panel data model) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
            
-0.0047 
(0.1309) 
0.0628 
(0.1073) 
0.0639 
(0.2186) 
-0.0053 
(0.1405) 
    
                
0.1190 
(0.1453) 
0.2020 
(0.1220)* 
0.0306 
(0.1247) 
-0.0183 
(0.1882) 
lnPOP 
0.3004 
(0.5448) 
-0.2866 
(0.2423) 
-0.1012 
(0.6045) 
0.2657 
(0.5275) 
-0.0824 
(0.2684) 
0.0497 
(0.2223) 
-0.2332 
(0.3861) 
-0.4121 
(0.6184) 
lnRGDP 
-0.9529 
(1.5798) 
-1.125 
(1.3168) 
-0.6328 
(2.0911) 
-0.7641 
(1.5521) 
-1.2738 
(1.4094) 
-1.0885 
(1.0059) 
-0.7069 
(1.1556) 
-1.9803 
(1.5659) 
YoS 
-0.0492 
(0.3788) 
0.3322 
(0.4946) 
0.0668 
(0.3270) 
-0.0592 
(0.5877) 
0.1178 
(0.1989) 
0.1385 
(0.1106) 
0.0919 
(0.3508) 
0.177 
(0.2040) 
Openness 
0.0120 
(0.0227) 
-0.0194 
(0.0182) 
-0.0130 
(0.0196) 
0.0026 
(0.0184) 
-0.0094 
(0.0077) 
-0.0048 
(0.0075) 
-0.0136 
(0.0113) 
-0.0171 
(0.0246) 
ToT 
0.0178 
(0.0148) 
0.0057 
(0.0138) 
0.0078 
(0.0133) 
0.0113 
(0.0129) 
0.0090 
(0.0168) 
0.0124 
(0.0063)** 
0.0200 
(0.0114)* 
0.0363 
(0.0175)** 
KAOPEN 
-0.6642 
(0.4085) 
-0.4670 
(0.2435)* 
-0.3584 
(0.6691) 
-0.6262 
(0.3914) 
-0.4744 
(0.2978) 
-0.5461 
(0.2780)** 
-0.6193 
(0.5552) 
-0.2602 
(0.4109 
IFIGDP 
0.1441 
(0.0786)* 
   
0.1736 
(0.0584)*** 
   
GEQY  
0.7182 
(0.4077)* 
   
0.4386 
(0.1437)*** 
  
TA/GDP   
-0.5305 
(1.7213) 
   
-1.247 
(1.4319) 
 
TL/GDP   
1.0528 
(1.8290) 
   
1.6409 
(1.4117) 
 
TEqA/GDP    
0.6375 
(1.4033) 
   
-3.5507 
(2.9872) 
TEqL/GDP    
-0.6136 
(2.1134) 
   
3.0824 
(3.8377) 
TDeA/GDP    
-0.1488 
(1.6318) 
   
-2.2286 
(1.7366) 
TDeL/GDP    
1.0097 
(1.0347) 
   
3.1673 
(1.8540)* 
Constant 
7.4168 
(13.1860) 
13.5781 
(10.7419) 
8.4761 
(18.7740) 
6.6779 
(13.1611) 
14.0032 
(13.4398) 
10.0222 
(10.7250) 
9.1441 
(12.2441) 
20.5419 
(18.9124) 
Obs. 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 
AR(2) test p-value 0.019 0.025 0.047 0.018 0.103 0.106 0.039 0.134 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 3.4b  Effects of Financial Integration on Economic Volatility (Non-OECD countries, Dynamic panel data model) 
Dependent Variable GDP Growth Standard Deviation (     ) Consumption Growth Standard Deviation (     ) 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
            
0.2306 
(0.0520)*** 
0.2144 
(0.0546)*** 
0.2094 
(0.0516)*** 
0.2231 
(0.0500)*** 
    
                
0.3242 
(0.0493)*** 
0.3258 
(0.0570)*** 
0.3273 
(0.0620)*** 
0.2932 
(0.0731)*** 
lnPOP 
-0.2370 
(0.0628)*** 
-0.2865 
(0.0715)*** 
-0.2087 
(0.0785)*** 
-0.2676 
(0.1007)*** 
-0.3904 
(0.0892)*** 
-0.4274 
(0.1133)*** 
-0.2794 
(0.0880)*** 
-0.2911 
(0.1137)*** 
lnRGDP 
-0.0257 
(0.2755) 
0.1143 
(0.2634) 
0.0031 
(0.2680) 
0.4085 
(0.3815) 
-0.6675 
(0.3595)* 
-0.5698 
(0.4800) 
-0.3538 
(0.3282) 
-0.2731 
(0.4118) 
YoS 
-0.0913 
(0.0970) 
-0.1571 
(0.0992) 
-0.0879 
(0.0981) 
-0.2075 
(0.1358) 
-0.0121 
(0.1242) 
-0.0125 
(0.1563) 
-0.0141 
(0.1094) 
-0.0284 
(0.1476) 
Openness 
0.0008 
(0.0032) 
-0.0022 
(0.0033) 
0.0024 
(0.0030) 
-0.0015 
(0.0043) 
-0.0025 
(0.0035) 
-0.0024 
(0.0050) 
0.0021 
(0.0038) 
0.0031 
(0.0046) 
ToT 
0.0100 
(0.0069) 
0.0083 
(0.0067) 
0.0101 
(0.0072) 
0.0126 
(0.0071)* 
-0.0016 
(0.0041) 
-0.0016 
(0.0044) 
0.0028 
(0.0039) 
0.0022 
(0.0046) 
KAOPEN 
-0.0218 
(0.0981) 
0.0206 
(0.0810) 
0.0151 
(0.0989) 
-0.0478 
(0.1031) 
-0.0128 
(0.1226) 
-0.0319 
(0.1255) 
-0.0360 
(0.1334) 
-0.0534 
(0.1489) 
IFIGDP 
0.0461 
(0.0505) 
   
0.1820 
(0.0964)* 
   
GEQY  
0.3249 
(0.2278) 
   
0.2602 
(0.2671) 
  
TA/GDP   
-0.4306 
(0.2777) 
   
-0.9833 
(0.2945)*** 
 
TL/GDP   
0.5801 
(0.2709)** 
   
1.3243 
(0.3529)*** 
 
TEqA/GDP    
-0.1387 
(1.0161) 
   
0.1418 
(1.1665) 
TEqL/GDP    
0.9793 
(0.8119) 
   
0.4698 
(1.0326) 
TDeA/GDP    
-0.3633 
(0.4213) 
   
-1.3393 
(0.3959)*** 
TDeL/GDP    
0.3239 
(0.3066) 
   
1.6008 
(0.4219)*** 
Constant 
4.4648 
(1.9748)** 
4.5683 
(1.9989)** 
3.5508 
(2.8225) 
1.5617 
(2.6097) 
11.9931 
(2.5761)*** 
11.7061 
(3.1782)*** 
7.0778 
(2.6600)*** 
6.8849 
(3.4440)** 
Obs. 448 438 448 429 460 450 460 441 
AR(2) test p-value 0.888 0.929 0.764 0.784 0.178 0.184 0.208 0.187 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
            2. *, **, *** indicates coefficient different from null at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively. 
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Appendix: 
Data source 
Sources Variables 
Penn World Table 7.1 
Population; Real GDP per capita; Trade 
openness; Term of trade 
Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset 
(Barro and Lee, 2010) 
Year of schooling 
The Chinn-Ito Index 
(Chinn and Ito, 2008) 
KAOPEN 
External Wealth of Nations Dataset 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) 
IFIGDP; GEQY; External assets; External 
liabilities 
 
  
102 
 
 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Ping-Hang Fan 
Place of Birth: Taipei, Taiwan 
Email: pfan@uwm.edu 
Citizen Taiwan 
Education University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 
 Ph.D., Economics, expected December 2013 
 Primary Thesis Advisor: Hamid Mohtadi 
 Shin Hsin University, Taipei Taiwan 
 M.B.A., Finance, June 2004 
 
Thesis: “Investment Style Strategies: Momentum vs. 
Fundamental Styles.” 
 Nation Taipei University, Taipei, Taiwan 
 
B.A., Public Finance, June 2002 
Interests 
International Economics, Applied Econometrics, 
Macroeconomics, International Economic Development 
Publications: • Ping-Hang Fan, (2007) “Performance Valuation of Financial 
Institutions in Taiwan,” Taiwan Economic Research Monthly, 
Vol. 30, No. 7, p. 20-27. 
• Ping-Hang Fan, (2007) “International Energy Circumstance and 
Prospect,” Taiwan Economic Research Monthly, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 
113-120. 
• Chia-Yen Yang, Ping-Hang Fan, (2007) “Study on the Industrial 
Added Value,” Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department of 
Industrial Technology. 
• Ping-Hang Fan, (2007) “Reviews and Outlook of International 
Economics,” 2006 Taiwan industrial Outlook, Industry & 
Technology Intelligence Services, p. 1-1-1-12. 
• Ping-Hang Fan, (2006) “The Variation and Effect of BRIC’s 
Stock Markets,” Taiwan Economic Research Monthly, Vol. 29, 
No. 8, p. 36-46. 
103 
 
 
 
• Ping-Hang Fan, (2006) “Analysis and Forecast of Global 
Economy,” TEEMA’s Yearbook of the Electrical and Electronic 
Industries, Taiwanese Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers’ 
Association, p. 20-23. 
• Ping-Hang Fan, (2006) “Economic Outlook of European Union,” 
Annual Survey on Taiwan Industrial Trends 2006, Taiwan 
Institute of Economic Research, p. 18-26. 
• Min-Hua Kuo, Nai-Fong Kuo, Yao-Chu Chiu, Ping-Hang Fan, 
(2005)  “Gender and Taiwanese Individual Stock Investors’ 
Behavior,” Journal of Financial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 1-28. 
• Jau-Ling Tseng, Ping-Hang Fan, Jyun-Hong Lin, (2004) “The 
Valuation of Taiwan Bills Companies- The Application of DEA 
Model,” Taiwan Business Bank Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 197-
218. 
Manuscript 
Under 
Review: 
International Capital Mobility Revisited: A Dynamic View of 
Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle (with Hamid Mohtadi, Job Market 
Paper, being revised for resubmission to IMF Economic Review) 
Works In 
Progress: 
•   Financial Integration, Risk Diversification, and Growth (with 
Hamid Mohtadi) 
 
•   Financial Integration and Economic Volatility (with Hamid 
Mohtadi) 
Conference: U of Wisconsin Madison : 10th Midwest International Economic 
Development Conference    April 2013 
Presentation: “International Capital Mobility Revisited: 
Resurrecting the Feldstein-Horioka Hypothesis” 
Discussant: “Productivity As If Space Mattered: An Application to 
Factor Markets Across China” by Wenya Cheng, John 
Morrow and Kitjawat Tacharoen 
Referee 
Service: 
• Journal of International Money and Finance in 2013 
• Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 
in 2013 
• International Economic Journal in 2012, and 2013 
Professional 
Experience: 
Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER), Taipei, Taiwan 
Assistant Researcher, February 2006-September 2007. 
104 
 
 
 
Teaching: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (GTA) 
Course Taught Independently 
Introductory Economics, Fall 2009-Spring 2012 
Honors: The Phi Tau Phi Scholastic Honor Society of the Republic of 
China, June 2004 
 
